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1. INTRODUCTION
Japanese financial institutions have long been shackled by a
web of legal restriction and labyrinthine regulation that has
segmented financial institutions into limited fiefdoms, insularly
limiting their ability to compete against one another. The
catastrophic result of such daimyo-style regulation1 is evident in
the general non-competitiveness of Japanese financial institutions,
massive nonperforming loan problems, and the bankruptcies of
several prominent financial institutions. In response to this
financial malaise, Japan recently has begun loosening many of the
legal shackles that have, inter alia, traditionally prohibited and
restricted mergers and acquisitions of financial institutions in
Japan's tightly segmented financial industry. The poor
performance of Japanese financial institutions has given them the
incentive to utilize this freedom to combine in new ways to
achieve business objectives in an environment less encumbered by
restrictions on financial integration.
As financial institutions, both domestic and foreign,
* Associate, White & Case LLP, Tokyo; LL.M. Kyushu University; J.D.
Harvard University; A.B. University of California at Berkeley. The author
would like to thank in particular Professor Toshimitsu Kitagawa for
introducing me to officials at the Japanese Fair Trade Commission, Professor
Luke Nottage for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and the
Japanese Ministry of Education Scholarship Program (Monbusho) for
providing financial assistance, making this research possible.
1 Daimyo were Japanese feudal fiefdoms headed by feudal lords, through
which the Japanese Shogun indirectly controlled Japan. Members of the ruling
warrior-class aristocracy (bakufu) enjoyed near monopolies on power and
economic activity within their respective dairnyo, but competed with other
daimyo for official favors and territorial expansion.
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increasingly begin to take advantage of the freedoms provided by
a newly liberalized legal environment, they will test the
boundaries of this new legal environment for corporate
combinations of financial institutions. Section 2 of this article
provides some brief background on the forces driving the need
for change and the status of merger and acquisition activity in
Japan generally. Section 3 explores how the financial business
laws and regulations have all but eliminated mergers and
acquisitions among financial institutions, and how a series of
deregulatory measures has expanded the contours of financial
activity by breaking down legal and regulatory barriers to
corporate combination. In light of the recent elimination of the
ban on financial holding companies, Section 4 explores how the
Antimonopoly Law's legal and regulatory standards impact
mergers and acquisitions of financial institutions. Finally, Section
5 discusses the emergence of merger and acquisition-related
activity in the financial sector and concludes that greater merger
and acquisition activity should result as economic forces drive
consolidation activity in a new legal environment.
2. THE FORCES DRIVING THE NEED FOR GREATER JAPANESE
MERGER AND ACQUISITION ACTIVITY AMONG FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS
2.1. Economic Problems
Prompting the recent reforms is a financial system that has
been broken by decades of inefficiencies-the product of
systematic protection from internal and external competition.
The Japanese financial system was exceptionally good at
channeling capital away from consumption and toward
investment, which helped to propel its rise to economic power.
A byproduct of this same system, however, has been an
excessively low cost of capital and a corresponding low return on
the investment of that capital. Indeed, on an inflation-adjusted
basis, Japanese bank interest rates and the earnings on yield have
been lower than those in the United States for almost all the past
two decades.2 Decades of high growth and a bubble economy
built on land assets managed to mask the underlying inefficiencies
2 See E. Keith Henry & Ken Okamura, Big Bang: Shaping the Future of
Japan's Economy, AM. CHAMBER COM. JAPANESEJ., Mar. 1998, at 11, 12.
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throughout the 1980s. But with the burst of the Japanese
economic bubble, Japan was painfully awakened as to the
inefficiency of the financial institutions at the core of its
economic system. As the Japanese economy spiraled into
recession, it was hit with steep drops in land prices and stock
prices.3 This was accompanied by a resultant massive amount of
non-performing loans for financial institutions to shoulder
(including the jusen mondai), the downgrading of the
creditworthiness of Japanese banks with the imposition of a
"Japan premium" on world capital markets,4 and a series of
bankruptcies, most notably those of Yamaichi Securities-Japan's
fourth largest brokerage-and Hokkaido Takushokku Bank-the
first major bank to fail since World War IIVs Economic concerns
were only compounded by the realization that the dismal rates of
returns being squeezed out of the current financial system,
combined with a rapidly aging population, meant massive
underfunding of the pension system.6 At the same time, scandal
after scandal has broken out detailing shady relations among
powerful individuals from the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of
Japan, banks, and brokerage firms. Clearly, this broken system
needed fixing.
2.2. Pressures from the Foreign Environment
Along with this awakening as to the tattered state of the
Japanese economy came the realization that Japan's sheltered
financial fiefdoms looked increasingly dysfunctional in the world
financial system. In terms of return on equity, return on assets,
3 Over the past ten years, the volume of shares of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange has fallen by 53%. Since 1991, the number of foreign company
listings has been halved. Between 1992 and 1995, Tokyo was the only major
foreign exchange center that shrank, with some foreign exchange trading
migrating to Hong Kong and Singapore. Singapore also now manages one-
third of the trading in Japanese stock index futures. Fewer foreign companies
and investors are borrowing or saving in yen, a trend that should be further
exacerbated by the introduction of the Euro. See Bang, Pop or Splutter?,
ECONOMIST, May 9, 1998, at 29.
4 See, e.g., Yozo Matsuda, Japan Premium as High as Rates in Developing
Nations, DAILY YOMIURI, Dec. 6, 1997, at 12.
' In addition to these bankruptcies, a number of smaller institutions such
as Sanyo Securities, Hanwa Bank, Tokuyo City Bank, and Kizu Credit
Corporation have also gone bankrupt.
£ See, e.g., Kathy Matsui, Demographic Tsunami, LOOK JAPAN, Dec. 1997,
at 36-37.
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and other measures of business efficiency, Japanese financial
institutions are extremely unprofitable! In other markets where
Japanese financial institutions can't lay claim to a protective
regulatory regime, competitive pressure from more diversified,
sophisticated western banks has helped roll back the efforts of
many less flexible Japanese financial institutions abroad!
While Japanese finance remains stagnant, financial institutions
in the rest of the industrialized world continue to grow in size
and scope. Financial institutions in Europe and the United States
have been merging on a massive scale to take advantage of the
blurring lines between financial products and the promised
synergies of "one stop shopping." Meanwhile, most recent
Japanese merger and acquisition activity has been limited largely
to a few paltry acquisitions of insolvent banks.9 Europe, already
the home of universal banking, has undergone a wave of
consolidation including the acquisition by Dutch ING of
Belgium's Banque Bruxelles Lambert, the merger of Sweden's
Nordbanken with Merita of Finland, and the massive merger of
Swiss Bank Corp. and Union Bank of Switzerland to form United
Bank of Switzerland." In the United States, the reach of the
Glass-Steagall Act has continued to weaken as bank holding
companies structure around a more flexible legal environment."
In 1997, the financial sector accounted for one-third of the total
7 See Kenneth S. Courtis, A Big Bang or a Wee Whimper?, LOOK JAPAN,
Nov. 1997, at 13, 14; Katayama Osamu,Japan's Big Bang, LOOK JAPAN, Nov.
1997, at 3, 9.
' Leading western banks are able to propose new issues of stock, loans, and
derivatives. Japanese banks, by contrast, cannot do much more than provide
loans. Several Japanese banks, such as Nippon Credit Bank, have already
pulled out of overseas operations, unable to compete with western banks
regarded as offering superior asset-management and investment-banking
capabilities. In response, Sanwa Bank and Dai-Ichi Kangyo are trying new
types of wholesae and investment-banking operations through strategic
alliances with banks in other Asian countries. See Masato Ishizawa, Banks Boost
Asian Alliances, NIKKEI WKLY., Feb. 16, 1998, at 1. Japanese banks have also
been reducing their presence in Europe. See, e.g., Big Japanese Banks Pulling
Out of France, Merging European Branches, NIKKEI SHIMBUN available at
< http://web.nikkei.co.jp/enews/SPECIAL/bigbang/bigbang61.html >.
' This was the case, for example, in Daiwa Bank's acquisition of Cosmo
Securities and Mitsubishi Bank's acquisition of Nippon Trust.
" See, e.g., The Craze That's Sweeping the Continent: Mergers, Bus. WK.,
Dec. 29, 1997, at 48.
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merger and acquisition deals concluded in the United States.12 In
the banking industry alone, more than 370 bank and thrift deals
were announced in 1997 with a total price tag of $93 billion; such
deals included the following: Merrill Lynch & Co.'s $5.3 billion
acquisition of Mercury Asset Management, Morgan Stanley &
Co.'s merger with Dean Witter, Discover & Co, and the Bankers
Trust acquisition of Alex. Brown & Sons.
13
Of all the mergers, perhaps the most alarming to Japanese
financiers is the proposed merger of Citicorp and Travelers
Group to form Citigroup, slated to become the world's largest
financial institution with a market capitalization of $135 billion. 4
Citibank already has over twenty branches in Japan and has
proved itself to be a formidable competitor pushing against an oft-
times slumbering status quo. To do this, it has utilized such
"radical" innovations as twenty-four hour ATMs, multi-currency
bank accounts, and the linking of its branches with the nation's
postal savings network-much to the annoyance of Japanese
commercial banks who had previously boycotted such a link. In
the wake of the merger, Akio Utsumi, senior executive director at
Mitsubishi Trust and Banking, noted the significance of the event
by responding, "From now on, mergers between financial
institutions in different areas will be accelerated.""5 The recent
tie-up of Japanese and foreign financial entities will only heighten
concern among Japanese financial institutions.
2.3. Increased Receptiveness to M&A Activity in Japan
In general, however, merger and acquisition activity in Japan
has traditionally come nowhere near fulfilling the important role
that it has in other industrialized countries. To some extent,
12 See Citicorp-Travelers Deal Sends Another Wake-up Call to Japan, NIKEI
WKLY., Apr. 13, 1998, at 16.
13 See Debra Sparks, Bank Shots Will Be Trickier, Bus. WK., Dec. 29, 1997,
at 58; see also Yasumasa Shimizu, Secluded Financial Pasture finds U.S. Bull in its
Midst, NIKKE WKLY., Feb. 16, 1998, at 1.
14 See Masato Ishizawa, Japan to Feel Effects of U.S. Megamerger, NIKKEI
WKLY., Apr. 13, 1998, at 12 [hiereinafterJapan to Feel Effects]. Travelers Group
just acquired Salomon Smith Barney Holdings Inc. as an investment banking
and securities subsidiary in 1997, itself the product of another merger between
Salomon and Smith Barney. Travelers is a nonbank financial service company
with core businesses in securities and insurance. Citicorp's main business is its
banking unit, Citibank.
15 Id.
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Japanese merger and acquisition activity began to cause a stir in
the 1980s with a number of Japanese acquisitions abroad,
including some prominent American companies. Such merger
and acquisition activity, however, took place beyond the borders
of Japan. The converse, takeovers or mergers in Japan by foreign
companies, remains extremely rare.16 Foreign hostile takeovers of
Japanese firms are nonexistent, and foreign acquisition activity
has largely been limited to buying out the Japanese partner of
joint ventures between foreign and Japanese companies." In
those very rare cases where a foreign company has successfully
taken over a Japanese business, the acquisition has often been
preceded by a long-term business relationship- as was the case
with Merck's acquisition of Banyu, one of the better known cases
of an acquisition of a Japanese company by a foreign entity."
The relative paucity of corporate combination activity in
Japan is by no means limited to activity involving foreign entities.
Although domestic activity is limited by international
comparison, most acquisitions that do occur are friendly and
involve acquisitions of very small corporations; they also often
revolve around acquired companies in financial trouble (in which
case the acquirer coming to the rescue normally comes from the
same keiretsu), or involve the acquisition of financially sound but
small family enterprises. The much rarer, larger-scale acquisitions
are generally those that have been sanctioned by the government.
Prominent examples of government-sanctioned mergers from
Japan's first merger waves (or perhaps ripples) occurred during
the mid-1960s and early 1970s and were defined by the merger of
three heavy industries in the Mitsubishi group in 1964; the
merger of Prince Motors and Nissan Motor Corporation in 1966;
the Fuji Iron & Steel and Yawata Iron & Steel merger in 1970 to
form Nippon Steel; and the merger of Dai-Ichi Bank and Nippon
16 From 1955-1984, foreign companies acquired majority interests in only
32 Japanese firms. These were mostly petty acquisitions, including mostly
minor sales outlets and noapublic companies. Since 1986, 24 American
majority acquisitions have t. en place, but 13 of them were joint venture
buyouts or transfers of foreign subsidiaries. See W. CARL KESTLER, JAPANESE
TAKEOVER: THE GLOBAL CONTEST FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 137 (1991)
(citing Walter Ames & Michael Young, Foreign Acquisitions in Japan: Handling
the Ultimate Barriers, J. AM. CHAMBER COM. JAPAN, Jan. 1986, at 10-29).
17 See id.
11 See id. at 141.
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Kangyo Bank to form Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank in 1971.19 The fact
that one must span decades to find sizable mergers indicates the
relative rarity of these large domestic merger transactions.
Commentators have advanced a number of reasons for the
relative nonutilization of mergers and acquisitions in Japan: the
low position of shareholders relative to other stakeholders in
often heavily leveraged Japanese corporations (e.g., relative to
employees and creditors such as a main bank), cross-shareholding
of shares (mocbiai) among keiretsu firms that collectively amount
to majority stable shareholding, and the consequent lack of a
market for corporate control on the stock exchanges.2" Other
factors include problems with the Japanese tender offer system21
and restrictions imposed by the Foreign Exchange and Foreign
Trade Control Law."
Compared with the United States, Japan continues to have
substantially less merger and acquisition activity. However, the
number of reported mergers and acquisitions has increased in
recent years from 988 mergers and 1,450 acquisitions in fiscal year
1989 to 1,476 mergers and 2,271 acquisitions in fiscal year 1996.'
More recently, these numbers have included some higher profile
mergers. For example, recent activity included the creation of
Mitsui Chemicals through the merger of Mitsui Petrochemical
Industries, the merger of Japan Paper Industry and Jujo
Paperboard Industry, the merger of Japan Telecom and
International Telecom Japan, the announcement that Chichibu
Onoda Cement and Nihon Cement would merge, the formation
19 See Dan Fenno Henderson, Foreign Takeover ofJapanese Corporations, in
JAPANESE COMMERCIAL LAW IN AN ERA OF INTERNATIONALIZATION 89, 93
(Hiroshi Oda ed., 1994).
20 See id. at 99-102.
21 See Martin Saywell, The Ultimate Barrier Revisited: Mergers and
Acquisitions in Japan, in JAPANESE COMMERCIAL LAW IN AN ERA OF
INTERNATIONALIZATION 41, 44-49 (Hiroshi Oda ed., 1994).
22 See id. at 50; H. LEIGH FRENCH, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TAKEOVERS
AND MERGERS: ASIA, AUSTRALIA, AND OCEANIA 16-17 (1986). The
liberalization of foreign exchange under the newly revised Gaikoku Kawase
Oyobi Boeki Kanri Ho [Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law],
Law No. 228 of 1949, makes this factor, to the extent it ever was one, no
longer an issue.
13 See INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, FAIR TRADE COMMISSION,
How THE JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION ENSURES A ROBUST ECONOMY 25
(APRIL 1998); see also Bill Spindle, Merger Boomlet Takes Hold in Japan, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 13, 1998, at A18.
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of Tokyo Mitsubishi Bank, the merger of New Oji Paper and
Honshu Paper, and the merger between Oni Paper and Kanzaki
Paper.
24
Merger and acquisition activity involving foreign firms has
also picked up in number and more importantly, the joint-
venture buyout trend has been decreasing while the number of
majority control, or significant minority interest, in listed
company deals has been increasing, evincing "a growing cultural
acceptance of foreign control in Japan." 21 Behind the trend, some
believe that "[d]eregulation will inevitably produce financial
sector failures, providing the opportunities to pick up cheap assets
like distribution systems, client lists and personnel" and that
"[t]he pressure to perform may lead financial institutions,
particularly banks, to be more open to considering liquidating
their positions by selling their equity holdings in struggling
customers. 26  Furthermore, according to the Nihon Keizai
Shimbun's 1997 "Survey on Market Share for 100 Main
Products," many companies are turning to mergers and
acquisitions to increase their market share.' As competitive
pressures mount in a weak economy, the use of mergers and
acquisitions as a means of boosting competitiveness is gaining
greater acceptance. 8
2.4. "Big Bang" Deregulation
In response to Japan's economic plight and its stagnant
finance industry, Japan's policymakers have crafted the "Big
Bang" financial reform package. Following the mantra of making
Japan's markets "free, fair, and global" by 2001, the Big Bang
image symbolizes the destruction of the existing constraints on
24 See Asako Ishibashi, Hit by Change, NIKKEI WKLY., Oct. 6, 1997, at 1;
Mitsui Chemicals, Inc., NIKKEI WKLY., Jan. 19, 1999, at 14; Sei Sasaki, Telecom
Carriers to Merge, NIKKEI WKLY., Nov. 30, 1998, at 1.
25 While the value of deals plunged 68% in 1997, the number of deals
increased by 42%. See Michael Shatz, Direct Investment in Japan, 1997, AMER.
CHAMBER COM. J., May 1998, at 49.
26 Id.
' See Masayuki Morikawa, That M&A Feeling, LOOK JAPAN, Feb. 1998, at
18.
28 Various other forms of business alliances, such as joint production and
development agreements linking companies without merging them, have also
proliferated in recent years. For a discussion of some of these other financial
arrangements, see infra Section 5.
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the financial system in order to allow the financial system to
reconstitute itself in a more efficient form.29 In reality, a "long
bang" (i.e., a crackle of firecrackers with delayed fuses going off
over several years) more aptly describes the step-by-step reforms
constituting Japan's Big Bang.3" Nonetheless, the Big Bang is a
watershed in Japanese finance. In essence, the Big Bang promotes
change by making the financial system freer and more open to
competition. New players may enter the competitive fray more
easily, companies have greater freedom to compete on price,3" and
the legal walls break down that sheltered finance from
competition. Particularly with respect to merger and acquisition
activity, the Big Bang promotes consolidation among financial
institutions by breaking down legal and regulatory walls that
have historically prevented combination activity in the financial
sector.
29 For more on Japan's Big Bang, see the Ministry of Finance's web site at
< www.mof.go.jp/eng-lish/index.htm >.
" With the UK's Big Bang of October 27, 1986, the enforcement of the
Big Bang came into play all on the same day. The trading floor of the stock
exchange was abolished; the system of market-making was introduced;
membership of the stock exchange was opened to all interested parties; the
brokerage commission was liberalized; and most of the securities brokers were
eventually absorbed into British merchant banks, securities companies, and
banking institutions of the United States and Continental Europe. See
Sadakazu Osaki, Financial System Reform, in JAPANESE FINANCIAL MARKETS
253 (Shigenobu Hayakawa ed., 1996).
31 The Ministry of Finance has traditionally formally and informally
regulated insurance premiums, deposit terms and rates, and brokerage
commissions. In fact, more than 12 years after London eliminated its fixed
share trading commission and more than 20 years after the United States
eliminated set commissions, commissions in Japan will remain fixed on certain
trades until their scheduled elimination some time in 1999. Non-price
competition was also frowned upon by the regulators as demonstrated by the
regulation of branching and advertising or by the practice of financial service
institutions offering one and the same financial product or service at the same
time. See Yukihiko Endo, Historical Development of the Japanese Financial
System, in JAPANESE FINANCIAL MARKETS 8 (Shigenobu Hayakawa ed., 1996).
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3. THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL BUSINESS LAWS AND REGULATION
IN PREVENTING CORPORATE COMBINATION OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS
3.1. The Role of the Tradition of Compartmentalizing Financial
Activity in Preventing Mergers and Acquisitions
Merger and acquisition activity in the financial realm, in
particular, has been almost nonexistent in Japan for the past five
decades. In fact, the legal and regulatory regime extant for most
of this period rendered such activity almost impossible. Ministry
of Finance regulators tightly segmented financial activity to
minimize "excessive" competition among financial institutions,
and to channel capital to specific segments of the economy."
While a degree of segmentation within the financial industry is
not uncommon in modern financial regulatory regimes,33 Japan's
financial regulators went particularly far in hyper-partitioning
financial activity among specific financial institutions. This
traditional prohibition on the integration of financial activity has
been accomplished by minimizing overlapping areas of
competition between financial institutions, and by discouraging
merger and acquisition activity among financial institutions.
32 See, e.g., Curtis Milhaupt, Managing the Market: The Ministry of Finance
and Securities Regulation in Japan, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 423 (1994).
11 In the United States, for example, financial activity has been segmented
into commercial banks, thrift banks of various kinds (mutual savings banks,
savings and loans, and credit unions), brokerage firms, mutual funds and
investment companies, life insurance companies, property-liability insurance
companies, private pension funds, pension funds, underwriters, etc. Japan has
gone further than this with the separation of short-term and long-term funding
and the segregation of life insurers from all other types of insurance. The
United States also long discouraged bank mergers through a complicated
regime regulating branching, holding company activities, and mergers. For a
general overview, see, for example, WILLIAM LOVETT, BANKING AND
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS LAW 170-202 (1988). Deregulation over the past 20
years, however, has unleashed significant consolidation activity. See, e.g., Bevis
Longstreth & Ivan E. Mattei, Organizational Freedom for Banks: The Case in
Support, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1895 (1997). Even the weakened Glass-Steagall
Act has come under attack as being a burden on financial activities in the
United States. See, e.g., Note, The New American Universal Bank, supra note 11,
at 1319-21; Sarah Wagman, Note, Laws Separating Commercial Banking and
Securities Activities as an Impediment to Free Trade in Financial Services, 15
MICH. J. INT'L L. 949 (1994).
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3.1.1. Statutory Compartmentalization and Its Impact on
Corporate Combination
A multitude of business-related finance laws delineate the
broadest contours of financial institutions and financial
transactions in Japan. The most significant of these laws are the
Securities and Exchange Law34 and the Bank Law,3" which
fundamentally segregate the activity of banks and securities firms.
In addition to the Bank Law, which provides for the powers and
licensing of ordinary commercial banks (futsu ginko), a number of
other establishment laws govern specific types of depository
organizations, including the Long-Term Credit Bank Law,36 the
Foreign Exchange Bank Law," the Trust Business Law,38 the
Bank Trust Business Law,39 the Workers' Banking Institution
Law,' the Credit Associations Law,41 and the Credit Cooperative
Laws.42 The Insurance Business Law has divided the insurance
industry into two fiefdoms of casualty insurance companies and
life and property insurance companies.43 Other laws describe
3' Shoken Torihiki Ho, Law No. 25 of 1948.
s Ginko Ho, Law No. 59 of 1981 [hereinafter Bank Law]. Foreign bank
branches are chartered and regulated as branches of ordinary banks under the
Bank Law. See id. art. 47(2).
36 Choki Shin'yo Ginko Ho, Law No. 187 of 1952.
37 Gaikoku Kawase Ginko Ho, Law No. 67 of 1954.
31 Shintakugyo Ho, Law No. 65 of 1922.
3 Futsu Ginko No Shintaku Gyomu No Ken'ei To Ni Kansuru Horitsu
[Law Regarding Regular Banks' Concurrent Engagement in Trust Business],
Law No. 43 of 1943.
41 Rodo Kinko Ho, Law No. 227 of 1953.
41 Shin'yo Kinko Ho, Law No. 238 of 1951.
42 Kyodo Kumiai ni yoru Kin'yu Jigyo ni Kansuru Horitsu [Law
Concerning Financial Business by Cooperatives], Ldw No. 183 of 1949
[hereinafter Cooperatives Law] and Chusho Kigyo Kyodo Kumiai Ho
[Medium and Small Enterprise, Etc., Cooperative Association Law], Law No.
181 of 1949, art. 9-8(2).
43 See Hokengyo Ho [Insurance Business Law], Law No. 105 of 1996. The
Insurance Business Law of 1995 was the first complete revision of the
Insurance Business Law since its enactment in 1939. The new law abolished the
Hoken Boshu no Tori Shimari ni Kansuru Horitsu [Law Concerning the
Control of Insurance Soliciting], Law No. 171 of 1948, and Gaikoku Hoken
Jigyo ni Kansuru Horitsu [Law Concerning Foreign Insurers], Law No. 184 of
1949. A number of other laws further delineate the scope of the insurance
business in Japan. They are laws such as the Songai Hoken Ryoritsu Sanshutsu
Dantai ni Kansuru Horitsu [Law Concerning Non-Life Insurance Rating
Organizations], Law No. 193 of 1996; the Jidosha Songai Baisho Hoken Ho
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different areas of financial activity and require Ministry of
Finance approval for licenses to engage in activities within those
fields. Such laws include the Securities Investment Trust Law,'
the Securities Advisory Business Law,45 the Asset Securitization
Law,46 the Commodity Fund Law,47 and the Foreign Exchange
[Automobile Liability Security Law], Law No. 97 of 1955, and the Jishin
Hoken ni Kansuru Horitsu [Law Concerning Earthquake Insurance], Law No.
73 of 1966.
4 Shoken Toshi Shintaku Ho, Law No. 198 of 1951. Under this law, only
licensed cornpanies may originate and create securities investment trusts
(mutual funds) or advise trustees on trust asset management. Only trust banks
may administer these trusts as trustees in accordance with the instructions of
the originators. The law also regulates relationships between originators
(trusters) and other companies. See Masaki Yagyu, Securities Activities of
Japanese Banks Under the 1993 Japanese Financial System Reform, 15 NW J.
INT'L. L. & BUS. 303, 309 (1994). For a more detailed exploration of
investment trusts, see Yoshiki Shimada et al., Regulatory Frameworksfor Pooled
Investment Funds: A Comparison ofJapan and the United States, 38 VA. J. INT'L
L. 191 (1998).
41 Yukashoken ni Kansuru Toshikomongyo no Kisei To ni Kansuru
Horitsu [Law Regarding Restrictions, etc., on Securities Investment Advisory
Business], Law No. 74 of 1986. Under this law, only registered investment
advisors may engage in the investment advisory business and prior additional
approval is required to act as discretionary investment managers. The law
further .regulates relationships between investment advisors and other
companies.
46 Tokutei Saiken to ni Kakaru Jigyo no Kisei ni Kansuru Horitsu [Law
Regarding Restrictions on Business Relating to Specified Monetary Claims,
etc.], Law No. 77 of 1992. This law restricts activities relating to securitization
of lease and credit receivables of nonbanks to financial institutions and other
licensed companies which are authorized to acquire, pool, and securitize such
nonbank assets and/or distribute such asset-backed certificates. The law limits
engagement in other businesses, and allows only trust banks to package and
securitize such nonbank assets through trusts and to distribute beneficial
interests in such trusts. See Yagyu, supra note 44, at 309. For developments in
bank use of securitization, see, for example, Edward J. Park, Comment,
Allowing Japanese Banks to Engage in Securitization: Potential Benefits,
Regulatory Obstacles, and Theories or Reform, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 723
(1996).
"' Shohin Toshi Ni Kakaru Jigyo No Kisei Ni Kansuru Horitsu [Law
Regarding Restrictions on Business Relating to Commodity Investment], Law
No. 66 of 1991. Under this law, only financial institutions and other licensed
companies may originate and/or distribute interests in commodity investment
fun. Only trust banks can administer as trustees the funds taking the form of
trust and distribute certain kinds of beneficial interests in such trusts.
Furthermore, only approved companies can provide discretionary
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and Trade Control Law ("FETCL").48 Statutory classification of
financial activities into different categories of business, or
different legal entities with the power to engage in specific
categories of business, poses an initial difficulty for mergers and
acquisitions among financial institutions for both entity-based and
financial business-based reasons.
3.1.1.1. Entity-based Difficulties
The first difficulty arises when the merging institutions are
different legal entities chartered under different statutes, a
particular problem for mergers and acquisitions in the banking
industry.49 The banking business has been "divided into many
"' Gaikoku Kawase Oyobi Boeki Kanri Ho, Law No. 228 of 1949. This
law restricted the foreign exchange business of a bank, required prior approval
of the Minister of Finance of any bank that regularly engaged in such business
and required the use of a foreign exchange bank when engaging in foreign
currency transactions which involved either a non-resident or a payment in
any foreign currency. Revisions to the FETCL effective April 1998, however,
have since abolished the requirement requiring use of an authorized foreign
exchange bank.
" Compartmentalized banking is not unique to postwar financial
regulation in Japan. It has been noted that between the time of the
establishment of Japan's first modern banking law (the National Bank Act of
1872) and the end of World War II:
[T]he banking industry evolved into a heterogeneous system of
specialized institutions catering to particular financial markets. In
1921 savings banks were segregated from commercial banks in order
to limit depositors' exposure to risk. In addition, a sharp distinction
between commercial lending and industrial and agricultural financing
led to the demarcation of long-term and short-term l6nding
institutions.
Colin P.A. Jones, Note, Japanese Banking Reform: A Legal Analysis of Recent
Developments, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 387, 389 (1993) (footnote omitted)
(citing FEDERATION OF BANKERS ASSOCIATIONS OF JAPAN (ZENGINKYO),
THE BANKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN 11-13 (1989) [hereinafter BANKING SYSTEM]).
The partial segregation, initiated in 1921, "lasted until 1943 when, in order to
promote saving as a part of the war effort, the government allowed ordinary
anks to take deposits." Id. at 389 n.10 (citing BANKING SYSTEM at 12).
Furthermore, "a number of specialized (and often heavily government
subsidized) institutions were established to provide long-term financing for
industry, agriculture, and other specialized sectors of the economy." Id. at 389
(citing BANKING SYSTEM at 13-14). With the exception of the Nippon Kangyo
Bank (now known as Daiichi Kangyo Bank), founded in 1896, most of these
specialized institutions have since disappeared "either as a result of the
government's wartime policy of encouraging mergers or through postwar
occupation reforms." Td. at 390 (citing BANKING SYSTEM at 14). Yet, the
legacy of separation remains in the strict division between long-term and short-
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segments, including short-term banking, long-term banking, trust
banking, retail banking, wholesale banking, small businessbanking, and international trade banking. '  The statutory
regime compartmentalizes the activities of banks by allocating
sectors of the banking business to different financial institutions
and by providing for ordinary commercial banks (futsu ginko), as
well as a range of other banking organizations. Long-term credit
banks (choki shin'yo ginko)5 ' specialize in long-term loans
primarily to large corporations rather than to consumers. Trust
banks (shintaku ginko) also have been expected to engage in long-
term lending, but must manage such funds through trusts.52
Foreign exchange banks (gaikoku kawase ginko)"3 were created to
engage principally in foreign exchange transactions, activities
related to letters of credit, and other financing of international
trade. Credit cooperatives (shin'yo kumiai) and credit associations
(shin'yo kinko) were chartered to specialize in small business
banking and retail banking. 4 Other special institutions include
term institutions. "In 1922, the trust business was established as a sector
separate from ordinary banking and was an area in which only trust companies
and specialized trust banks cold engage." Id. (citing BANKING SYSTEM at 14-
15).
50 Yagyu, supra note 44, at 303.
51 Long-term credit banks have traditionally collected long-term funds by
issuing special debentures (kinyusaz) maturing in two to five years and discount
debentures maturing in one year. There are some legal restrictions on their
ability to take deposits and make short-term loans. The Industrial Bank of
Japan, the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, and Nippon Bond Credit Bank
are the only long-term credit banks in existence.
52 Trust Business Law, Law No. 65 of 1922, and Bank Trust Business Law,
Law No. 43 of 1943, restrict trust activities, permitting only licensed nonbank
trust companies and approved banks to engage in the trust business.
Traditionally, there had -been seven trust banks; the seven became six when
Mitsubishi Bank acquired Nihon Trust in 1994.
" The merger of the Bank of Tokyo (the only foreign exchange bank in
existence at the time) with the Mitsubishi Bank (an ordinary commercial bank)
functionally eliminated the category of foreign exchange bank.
" Credit cooperatives are co-operative banking institutions devoted to
mutual assistance among small businesses and workers founded under the
Medium and Small Enterprise, Etc., Cooperative Association Law, Law No.
181 of 1949, and the Cooperative Associations Law, Law No. 189 of 1949.
With the enactment of the Credit Associations Law, Law No. 238 of 1951,
those credit unions which had taken on the characteristics of general banking
institutions were allowed to embark on banking business as a credit
association. The services provided by credit associations are essentially the
same as those provided by ordinary banks, with the exception that credit
associations are not allowed, in principle, to give loans to non-members or
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the Shoko Chukin Bank,"5 labor banks (rodo kinko),56 and a three-
tiered agricultural banking system which includes agricultural
cooperatives" and fishery cooperatives 8 organized under the
Norin Chukin Bank (the Central Bank of Agriculture and
Forestry)." Specialized government and semi-private financial
institutions have also played a major role in the financial sector.'
operate outside their designated areas. Credit associations are members of the
National Federation of Credit Associations, which facilitates intermediation
among member associations. SeeMinoru Nakamura & Koji Yamada, Financial
Institutions of Japan, in JAPANESE FINANCIAL MARKETS 128 (Shigenobu
Hayakawa ed., 1996). Credit cooperatives have formed the National
Federation of Credit Cooperatives to perform a similar role. See id. Along
with ordinary banking activities, the credit cooperatives may take deposits and
engage in foreign exchange, but they may only issue loans and discount bills
for subscribers. See id.
" See Shoko Kumiai Chuo Kinko Ho [Shoko Chukin Bank Law], Law
No. 14 of 1936, art. 28(1)(xii). Partially financed by the government, the
Shoko Chukin Bank is a special institution established to provide financial
services for unions of small-sized and medium-sized enterprises. See Nakamura
& Yamada, supra note 54, at 130.
56 Similar to credit cooperatives, labor banks are cooperative institutions
whose primary activities consist of installment savings, lending, and deposit
transactions for labor unions and their members. Id.
" See Nogyo Kyodo Kumiai Ho [Agricultural Cooperative Law], Law
No. 132 of 1948, art. 10(6)(vii). These cooperative institutions cater to the
financial needs of the agricultural community and engage in a variety of
nonbanking businesses, including marketing agricultural products and
purchasing farm equipment. Agricultural cooperatives are also able to sell life
insurance policies and property and casualty insurance over the counter, giving
them traditionally a broader range of activities than other depository
institutions.
" See Suisangyo Kyodo Kumiai Ho [Fisheries Cooperatives Law], Law
No. 242 of 1948. Fishery cooperatives focus on lending members' savings to
members.
"' See Norin Chukin Bank Law, Law No. 42 of 1923, art. 13(1)(ix-ii).
Agricultural cooperatives are required to deposit a percentage of funds in their
respective prefectural Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives which in turn
must deposit a percentage in the Norm Chukin Bank. The Norin Chukin
Bank is essentially an agricultural central bank which raises funds not only
through collecting from prefectural federations but also through issuing
debentures. The Norin Chukin Bank either lends those funds to businesses
engaged in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries or it invests surplus funds in
security markets. See Nakamura & Yamada, supra note 54, at 128-29.
60 In addition to these private and semi-private institutions, the postal
savings system channels funds into the Ministry of Finance's Trust Fund
Bureau which funds government financial institutions such as the Japan
Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of Japan, as well as a number
of government financial corporations. See The Fiscal Investment and Loan
Program (FILP) Report '96 available at <http://www.mof.go.jp/zaito
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'7 Econ. L.
Most of the statutes authorizing these institutions permit
mergers with the authorization of the Ministry of Finance, but a
merger between financial institutions of differing legal entities
creates an issue as to what form the surviving legal entity should
take. The 1968 Law Concerning Amalgamation and Conversion
of Financial Institutions ("Financial Institution Amalgamation
Law") 6' reduced some of the ambiguity as to the permissibility of
mergers and acquisitions among depository institutions organized
under different laws. The law explicitly authorized mutual banks
(sogo ginko, since converted to the legal form of ordinary
commercial banks and de facto classified by the Ministry of
Finance as second-tier regional banks),62 ordinary commercial
banks, credit associations, and credit cooperatives to merge with
one another.63 The surviving or resultant entity could take the
form of either merging institution, except in the case of a merger
between an ordinary commercial bank or mutual bank and a
credit cooperative. In such case, the entity must take the form of
an ordinary commercial bank.6 The law also allowed certain
depository institutions to change their entity form to the entity
forms of certain other depository institutions. Ordinary
commercial banks could become mutual banks or credit
associations,65 while mutual banks could become ordinary
commercial banks.66 Credit associations could become ordinary
commercial banks or credit cooperatives.' Yet, the omission of
explicit approval for mergers involving labor banks, foreign-
exchange banks, and long-term credit banks has cast doubt on the
legal ability of these institutions to merge with one another.
The 1992 Financial System Reform Law amended the
/filp9.htm>.
61 Kin'yu Kikan no Gappei oyobi Tenkan ni Kansuru Horitsu, Law No.
86 of 1948.
62 See Sogo Ginko Ho [Mutual Loans and Savings Bank Law], Law No.
199 of 1951, repealed by Kin'yu Sedo oyobi Shoken Torihiki Seido no tame no
Kankei Horitsu no Seibi to ni Kansuru Horitsu [Maintenance of Laws Related
to the Financial System and Securities Exchange System Reform Law], Law
No. 87 of 1992 [hereinafter Financial System Reform Law].
63 Financial Institution Amalgamation Law art. 3, amended by Financial
System Reform Law.
64 See id. art. 3.





1998] M&A OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN JAPAN 981
Financial Institution Amalgamation Law in order to further
reduce statutory compartmentalization in the banking industry.68
Specifically, the amending act designates two categories of
depository institutions. "Banks" form the first category which
consists of ordinary commercial banks, long-term credit banks,
and foreign exchange banks.69 The second category, "cooperative-
form financial institutions" (kyodo soshiki kin'yu kikan) includes
credit cooperatives, labor banks, and credit associations."
Regardless of category, any of these financial institutions are
expressly authorized to merge with one another."1 The nature of
the entity which survives or is created by the merger, however,
will be determined by whether the merging institutions are
within the same category or in different categories. With respect
to mergers within the same category, the surviving or newly
established entity may take the form of either of the parties to the
merger.72 When there is a merger across categories, however, the
surviving or newly created institution will almost always take the
form of some kind of bank. The only exception to this is a
merger between a bank and a credit association, in which case the
resultant entity may be either a bank or a credit association. 3
In addition, the law encourages decompartmentalization by
permitting financial institutions to change the form of their legal
entity. Long-term credit banks or foreign exchange banks can
become ordinary commercial banks,74 while ordinary commercial
banks can become credit associations."5 In addition to being able
to change entity form to that of commercial banks, "cooperative
form financial institutions" may take the form of any other
"cooperative form institution."7 6
68 See id, For a detailed explanation of the current merger procedures for
depository institutions, see Shiseki Masamitsu,Kin yu Kikan no gappei tetsuzuki
ha do kawatta ka I, KIN'Yu HoMUjIJo No. 1494, Sept. 1, 1997, at 6-13; Shiseki
Masamitsu, Kin'yu Kikan no gappei tetsuzuki ha do kawatta ka II, KIN'Yu
HOMUJIJO No. 1496, Oct. 15, 1997, at 23-31.
69 Financial Institution Amalgamation Law art. 2(2), amended by Financial
System Reform Law.
70 See id. art. 2(3).
71 See id. art. 3 (1).
72 See id. art. 3(2).
73 See id. art. 3(2)(ii).
74 see id art. 4 (1).
71 See id. art. 4(2).
76 See id art. 4(3)-(5).
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3.1.1.2. Business-Activity Based Difficulties
Other difficulties exist where the ability to engage in a
particular business activity is drawn from an activity-based license
rather than a legal entity-based one. In order for financial
institutions engaging in different fields of financial business to
combine, they need to fulfill simultaneously the licensing
requirements mandated by regulations implementing the various
financial laws impacting each of the activities in which the
business is engaged. It may be impossible for the contemplated
merger or acquisition to result in a single legal entity where
licensing requirements conflict, or where simultaneous
engagement in these activities is expressly prohibited.
The most important example of such a prohibition is the
statutory wall separating the banking and securities industries.
The Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 ("SEL"),7 modeled
after the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 of the United States, was enacted, inter alia, to protect
depositors against bank losses from investing in risky securities
through the Article 65 separation of banking and security
activities. The SEL restricts the "securities" business to licensed
securities firms and imposes various regulations on these firms. 8
With the exception of specific exempted transactions performed
by certain approved financial institutions, financial institutions
other than securities firms are generally prohibited from dealing
in securities.79 The Bank Law bolsters this division by restricting
the banking business to licensed banks and restricting the
activities of licensed banks to the "core-banking business,"
"incidental banking business" (including "non-listed banking
business"), and "other banking business."8" While the boundary
7 Shoken Torihiki Ho, Law No. 25 of 1948 [hereinafter SEL].
78 See id. art. 28. Foreign security branches, however, are subject to a
special legal regime, known as the Gaikoku Shoken Gyosha ni Kansuru
Horitsu [Law Concerning Foreign Securities Dealers], Law No. 5 of 1971.
79 SEL arts. 28, 65-2, amended by Financial System Reform Law.
80 Bank Law art. 16-2(1), amended by Financial System Reform Law.
Permissible activities may be roughly divided into typical bank business (the
taking of deposits and installment savings; lending, discounting of bills and
notes; and transfer of funds); ancillary business which may be performed by
the bank or an affiliate (guarantees and bill acceptance; trading of securities,
securities index futures, securities options and foreign market securities futures;
securities lending; underwriting of government bonds, etc.); acquisition (ceding
of monetary claims, arrangement or private placement, subscription agency
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between banking and securities activities has eroded somewhat
since it was first imposed, the SEL Article 65 division still serves
as a powerful statutory roadblock nearly fifty years after its
original inception.81 Because the securities business is essentially
restricted to securities firms and because the banking business is
limited to banking institutions and to activities related thereto,
the SEL and the Bank Law at the very least prohibit the financial
integration of banking and securities institutions into the same
legal entity. 2
3.1.2. Regulatory Difficulties of Compartmentalization of
Financial Institutions
Beyond the express statutory provisions that restrict mergers
and acquisitions under the financial business laws, Ministry of
Finance regulation powerfully augments this legal framework to
compartmentalize these statutory divisions into further de facto
divisions. Ministry of Finance approvals are necessary both for
licensing new businesses and for the merger and acquisition of
financial institutions. The Ministry of Finance's traditional
regulatory philosophy of compartmentalization has been
antithetical to the combination of financial institutions or the
for local government, corporate and other bonds, etc.); securities business
(retail sales and dealing of government bonds); and peripheral business which
can only be undertaken by a bank's affiliate (leasing, venture capital,
management consultation, investment advisory services, and others). See, e.g.,
FEDERATION OF BANKERS ASSOCIATIONS OF JAPAN, JAPANESE BANKS 1996
11(1). For a detailed treatment of the legal and regulatory boundaries of banks
under the 1993 Financial Reform Law, see Yagyu, supra note 44.
8 The economic pressures that began to erode some of this separation are
known as the two kokusai-ka. Depending on the kanji characters used,kokusai-
ka can mean both internationalization and the growing use of government
bonds in the Japanese financial market. Banking organizations have gradually
won the right to engage in underwriting and dealing in government bonds,
derivative activities (e.g., futures and options) related to domestic and foreign
government bonds, and activities related to some money market instruments,
such as commercial paper and certificates of deposit. Banks also began
establishing locally incorporated subsidiaries in foreign countries through
which they engage in the securities business. Securities companies, for their
part, have begun to sell medium-term government securities funds, essentially
money market instruments, which compete with bank deposits. See generally
Jones, supra note 49 (discussing the erosion of the boundary between banking
and securities activities).
82 Similar restrictions exist in the establishment laws for other types of
depository entities. See, e.g., Long Term Credit Bank Law art. 6; Foreign
Exchange Bank Law art. 6.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
granting of the licensing approval necessary to enter multiple
fields of financial activity. For example, trust banks legally are
licensed ordinary commercial banks (futsu ginko). They possess
the same corporate powers of ordinary banks and are statutorily
augmented with trust power and permission to engage in the trust
business concurrently with the regular banking business. The
Ministry of Finance, however, has traditionally severed the trust
business away from ordinary banking to function as a specialized
form of long-term funding. At the same time, the Ministry of
Finance has taken the position of not granting approval of trust
business to other banking organizations, which strictly segregates
this segment from other banking segments and other financial
industries. 3 Similarly, although there is no legal restriction on
terms of deposits and loans for ordinary commercial banks, the
Ministry of Finance has customarily limited the terms of deposits
on a non-statutory basis in order to encourage commercial banks
to focus on retail banking by taking short-term deposits and
providing short-term credits.8 4  The activities of ordinary
commercial banks have been even further divided on a non-
statutory basis into city banks,"5 regional banks,86 and second-tier
"For historical reasons, prior to 1993, only three regular banks,Daiwa
Bank Ltd., Okinawa Bank Ltd., and Ryukyu Bank, Ltd., were permitted to
have limited trust power (excluding loan-trust)." Yagyu,supra note 44, at 304
n.3. Daiwa Bank has been able to engage in the trust business because it
opposed the separation of the trust business from commercial banks in the late
1950s and was the only city bank to operate a trust business. See Kazunari
Yokota, Daiwa Bank Poised to Bolster Trust Business, NIKKEI WKLY., Mar. 2,
1998, at 10. Trust services traditionally have encompassed five areas: (i)
ordinary banking service; (ii) long term loans to business corporations financed
by funds collected from individuals by selling "loan trust accounts" (with a
maturity of two to five years); (iii) asset management of corporate pension
funds; (iv) investment advisory service; and (v) custodian business of securities
investment trusts and tokkin trust funds. See, e.g., Nakamura & Yamada, supra
note 54, at 124.
84 See Yagyu, supra note 44, at 303.
83 The term "city bank" (toshi ginko) is used by the Ministry of Finance to
describe large ordinary commercial banks operating on a nation-wide basis.
The ten city banks locate most of their branches in the nation's three
economic centers (Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka) and provide short term credits
to large corporations.
86 The term "regional bank" (chiho ginko) is used by the Ministry of
Finance to describe relatively small ordinary commercial banks operating on a
regional basis, each based in a particular prefectural capital (there are 47
prefectures). Theyprovide loans to individuals and business corporations in
their prefecture, uncerwrite municipal bonds issued by their local government,
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regional banks (previously known as mutual banks)" according to
historical background, location, and customer base. The Ministry
of Finance has been known to treat these institutions differently,
even though they are legally all ordinary commercial banks (futsu
ginko).88
As for the division between banking and securities, the
Ministry of Finance has long sought to encourage
compartmentalization of Japanese institutions abroad even
though it lacked specific regulatory authority to regulate them
until 1992."9 The Ministry of Finance projected in diluted form
its concern for segregation of domestic financial institutions
abroad by imposing regulations on foreign subsidiaries of
Japanese financial institutions. Through the Three Bureau
Administrative Guidance (so-called because it is jointly enforced
by the Banking Bureau, the Securities Bureau, and the
International Finance Bureau of the Ministry of Finance) of
August 1975, the Ministry of Finance has given overseas
subsidiaries of Japanese securities companies priority over
and handle the receipt and payment of local government funds. Usually, there
is only one regional bank in each prefecture, but two or more exist where
economic activity is diversified.
87 The Financial System Reform Law repealed the Sogo Ginko Ho
[Mutual Loans and Savings Bank Law], Law No. 199 of 1951. Pursuant to the
amendment of the Mutual Banking Law, mutual banks that had been catering
exclusively to small and medium-sized enterprises were converted into
ordinary banks called "second-tier regional banks." Only these "sogo banks"
were permitted to deal in mutual installment funds. They were otherwise
permitted to engage in the same activities as ordinary banks, except that, with
exceptions, they could only issue loans to, or receive mutual installment
savings from, companies with three hundred or fewer employees or with
capital of less than a stated amount. See Jones,supra note 49, at 394 n.48.
"' See Yagyu, supra note 44, at 307 n.11. The banking industry's traditional
specialization system has significantly changed during the last decade as the
boundaries between realms of financial activity have blurred. The
segmentation between the long and short-term fund intermediaries are
vanishing due to innovations of financial technologies, such as interest rate
swaps, gradual deregulation of deposit terms, and access to foreign money
markets. For example, regular banks can issue long-term loans even at fixed
interest rates by using interest rate swaps. All types of banking organizations
have also been practically providing retail and small business banking services
because large companies have been changing at least a part of their fund raising
from bankloans to securities markets (e.g., debentures, commercial paper, etc.).
See id. at 305.
89 The bureaus justified their policy by citing the spirit of Article 65 of the
SEL which provides for the segregation of commercial banking and investment
banking. See Osaki, supra note 30, at 253.
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overseas securities subsidiaries of Japanese banks by acting as lead
manager of a debt issue offered or placed by a Japanese firm on an
overseas market when these two kinds of entities are in direct
competition with each other.9"
The Ministry of Finance's regulation has been so pervasive
that it has been characterized as a "convoy system" (goso sendan):
The imagery is understood to denote a tightly organized group of
financial institutions, each institution with its particular function,
that moves at the speed of its slowest member in order to protect
each institution and ensure that nobody sinks.91 The Ministry of
Finance compartmentalized financial services into several groups
according to the kinds of services that financial institutions
provided, adopted a licensing system and required these
institutions to engage exclusively in the areas of financial service
specified in the license. The striking success of the Ministry of
Finance's compartmentalization is evident in the fact that the
number of financial institutions in each segmented realm of
finance has been almost constant throughout the postwar
period.92  The only category in which there have been
noteworthy fluctuations in the number of financial institutions is
the securities industry up to the late 1960s. A telling testament to
the strength of the Ministry of Finance's licensing power is the
fact that these fluctuations almost stopped entirely once licensing
was adopted for the securities industry in 1968 in response to the
securities market crisis of 1965. 93
The convoy system is no longer what it once was. Its
deterioration is illustrated by the decompartmentalization
reforms discussed in Section 3 and by the recent bankruptcies of
major Japanese financial institutions. Yet, there remains a strong
mothering urge on the part of Ministry of Finance regulators.
' The 1992 Financial System Reform Law, which established that bank
securities subsidiaries are allowed to compete in each other's businesses with
some restrictions, led to the planned phase-out by March 1998 of the decades-
old Three Bureau Administrative Guidance. With the allowance of reciprocal
entry into one another's domestic markets, such regulation no longer made
sense as it merely restricted banks from underwriting bond issues on overseas
markets (which it could now do for domestic markets
91 For a good description of the history of the goso sendan, see Yoshino
Naoyuki, Kin'yu Biggu Ban no Haikei to Tenbo, 1119 JURISUTO, Sept. 15, 1997,
at3.
92 See app., tbl. 2.
' See Endo, supra note 31, at 9, tbl. 1.2; apps., tbl. 2.
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Perhaps the most interesting display of this tendency was the
Ministry of Finance's action to force acceptance of public funds.
The Ministry of Finance wanted the strongest banks to apply first
but strong banks did not want the stigma of applying first; the
very Japanese solution to this difficulty was for Japan's twenty-
one largest banks to apply for identical sums of public cash in
March 1998, despite differing needs for funding among these
twenty-one banks.94
3.2. Less Encumbered But Not Free: The 1992 Financial System
Reform Act
As the need for promoting greater integration became more
evident, the use of a separate legal entity such as a subsidiary or
holding company began to be debated as a means of promoting
greater integration that would mesh with the statutory
suprastructure of compartmentalization and the Ministry of
Finance's regulatory penchant for segmentation. Until recently,
however, holding companies were prohibited and holdings by
financial institutions were limited to 5% without special approval
from the Japanese Fair Trade Commission, and as a result of this
legal environment, limited capital affiliations, augmented by
linkages such as personnel exchanges, developed between some
firms.9" Yet, even these limited capital affiliations were regulated
if the company in which shares were held was deemed an affiliate.
Under administrative rules, a bank affiliate was defined as "a
company to which a bank has made and/or has maintained
capital contributions and which has close relationships to such
bank, by virtue of circumstances of its establishment, financial
and personnel relationships, etc."96 Such regulation drew its legal
authority from the Bank Law's prohibition against banks
engaging in activities other than the banking business, defined as
the core banking business, incidental banking business, and other
banking business.9' It had been thought that even indirectly
engaging in these activities through an affiliate was
94 See Bang, Pop or Splutter?, supra note 3, at 31.
9 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese
Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization,
102 YALE Lj. 871 (1993).
96 See Yagyu, supra note 44, at 365.
9' See Bank Law art. 1, amended by Financial System Reform Law.
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impermissible."
The Financial System Reform Law somewhat loosened a
number of restrictions on the activities of financial institutions.
In amending the existing statutes, including the laws governing
most types of financial institutions, it took an important step
toward de-compartmentalizing the Japanese financial world. The
Law expanded the product areas in which different types of
financial institutions were allowed to compete so that banks, for
example, are now allowed to engage in, inter alia, greater
securities-related activities.99 As for the securities industry, the
Financial System Reform Law expanded slightly and clarified the
definition of "security""° while at the same time permitting
banks to act as intermediaries for some of the instruments that
were newly designated as securities.'
When the Japanese government authorized certain financial
" Accordingly, certain activities are deemed completely unrelated to
banking. These include real estate retail business, travel agency business,
product sales, hotel business, warehouse business, marine courier business, and
mining business. See Yagyu, supra note 44, citing Kin'yu kikan to sono
kanrengaisha to no kankei ni tsuite (regarding Relationships Between Financial
Institutions and their Affiliates), Okurasho Ginko Kyoku [Ministry of Finance
Bank Bureau], No. 1968 (July 3, 1975), as amended.
" For example, the Financial System Reform Law amends the Bank Law
to permit all types of banks to participate in the private placement of securities
in the secondary market. SEL art. 10(2)(vi), amended by Financial System
Reform Law. Other types of financial institutions are also granted the same
permission. E.g., Labor Bank Law art. 58(2)(xii), amended by Financial System
Reform Law; Credit Association Law art. 53(3)(vi), amended by Financial
System Reform Law; Law for Small Business Cooperatives art. 9-8(2)(xi),
amended by Financial System Reform Law; Agricultural Cooperative Law art.
10(6)(vii), amended by Financial System Reform Law; Norin Chukin Bank Law
art. 13(1)(ix-ii), Law No. 42 of 1923, amended by Financial System Reform
Law; Shoko Kumiai Chuo Kinko Ho Shoko Chukin Bank Law art. 28(1)(xii),
Law No. 14 of 1936, amended by Financial System Reform Law; Long-Term
Credit Bank Law, Law No. 187 of 1952, art. 17. The financial system reform
law also expands the definition of a bank's primary activities from"acceptance
of term deposits" to "acceptance of term deposits, etc." Bank Law art. 10(1)(i),
amended by Financial System Reform Law.
" The SEL clarifies that private placements are "securities activities" for
legal purposes, but that banks may, with the Ministry of Finance's permission,
participate in private placements. SEL art. 2(8)(Vi), amended by Financial
System Reform Law. The definition of "security" is also expanded to a few
specific instruments such as commercial paper and lists a number of
instruments that may be designated as securities by administrative order some
time in the future. d. arts. 2(1), (2).
101 See id. arts. 65, 65(2).
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institutions to create subsidiaries to enter new and diverse fields
of financial activity, it took an important initial step toward the
combination of financial institutions and the integration of
formerly autonomous areas of financial activity. With approval
from the Ministry of Finance, banks are now allowed to establish,
acquire, and retain domestic securities and domestic trust banking
subsidiaries provided that the parent bank owns at least 50% of
the outstanding voting shares of the subsidiary." 2 In addition, the
SEL was revised to specifically state that the prohibition against a
bank conducting securities activities does not bar a bank's
acquisition of a securities firm. °3 Securities companies, in turn,
are permitted to establish trust and banking subsidiaries of their
own."4 Other kinds of banking organizations which are failing,
or have failed, can also be acquired, including deposit institutions
such as long term credit banks and foreign exchange banks.'
While the allowance of subsidiaries is a step toward the
integration of different fields of finance, it is a limited one. The
Financial System Reform Law, and the regulations implementing
it, are riddled with "for the time being" exceptions, limiting the
scope of activities of mutual entry subsidiaries.0 6 The law
conditions the licensing of bank securities subsidiaries upon their
refraining from engaging in securities brokering and from issuing,
distributing, or brokering most forms of equity securities; this
prohibition includes convertible bonds, warrant bonds, warrant
securities, stocks, stock index futures, and stock index options.
07
The regulations also establish a large number of firewalls,
including restrictions on personnel exchanges between parent and
102 See Bank Law art. 16-2(1), amended by Financial System Reform Law.
103 See SEL art. 65-3, amended by Financial System Reform Law.
See id. art. 43(2). The Financial System Reform Law also permits
smaller institutions, which are generally too small to establish full subsidiaries,
to engage in certain trust and securities-related activities by themselves. See,
e.g., Agricultural Cooperative Law arts. 10(7), (8),amended by Financial System
Reform Law.
105 See Yagyu, supra note 44, at 364 (citing Bank Law Administrative
Ordinance art i7-2( i)).
106 See Okura Sho (Ministry of Finance), Kin'yu seido kaikaku jisshi no gaiyo
ni tsuite [Concerning the Outline for the Implementation of Financial System
Reform], Dec. 17, 1992, reprinted in KIN'YU ZAISEI JIJO, Jan. 4, 1992, at 107
[hereinafter Financial System Reform]. See generally KANPO, Mar. 3, 1993
(Special Edition).
107 See Jones, supra note 49, at n.289 (discussing the limitations enforced on
securities subsidiaries of banks).
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subsidiary, dealings with common clients, transactions between
parent and subsidiary, and the shared use of facilities." 8 The
Ministry of Finance was also effectively allocated power to
expand or contract the law's reach essentially at will.
Prohibitions against transactions with subsidiaries or customers
can be waived by the Ministry of Finance if necessary for the
public interest." 9 Alternatively, the Ministry of Finance has the
power to designate transactions or activities between a parent
bank and its subsidiary or the subsidiary's customer as potentially
hindering the parent bank's sound and proper operations."' The
Ministry of Finance has discretion to designate by ordinance
which types of securities companies, trust banks, or other banks
can be acquired.' The law also adds a provision requiring a bank
to acquire authorization from the Ministry of Finance when it
tries to establish a securities or trust subsidiary in a foreign
country.
112
While regulations limit the scope of activities afforded to
financial institutions, these institutions have moved quickly to
take advantage of the new freedoms allotted to them. Pursuant to
the Ministry of Finance timeline, long-term credit banks, trust
banks, and central cooperatives are permitted to establish
securities subsidiaries first.' Accordingly, the Industrial Bank of
Japan, the Long-term Credit Bank of Japan, and the Central
Cooperative Bank for Agriculture and Forestry (Norinchukin
Bank) opened securities subsidiaries in July 1993, and trust banks
began establishing securities subsidiaries in late 1993.114 City
banks were not able to set up securities subsidiaries until the
"' Financial System Reform, supra note 106, at 107-08.
109 See SEL art.16-3, amended by Financial System Reform Law.
110 See id. arts. 10, 16(2)(3).
" See Bank Law art. 16-2(3), amended by Financial System Reform Law.
12 See id. art. 16-4.
1 See Financial System Reform, supra note 106, at 109.
114 Mitsubishi Trust and Banking Corporation and Sumitomo Trust &
Banking Co, Ltd. established securities subsidiaries in November 1993
followed by Asahi Bank in July 1994 and Yasuda Trust & Banking in August
1994. In November 1994, the following city banks established securities
subsidiaries: Daichi Kangyo Bank, Sakura Bank, Fuji Bank, Tokyo Mitsubishi
Bank, Sanwa Bank, and Sumitomo Bank. Other financial institutions later
followed: Tokai Bank (March 1995), Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (April 1995),
Mitsui Trust (May 1995), and Toyo Trust (September 1995). Additionally, in a
rescue maneuver, Cosmo Securities was permitted to become a subsidiary of
Daiwa Bank in September 1995.
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summer of 1994. Authorization for trust bank subsidiaries
started later, in April 1994, with the authorization of federations
of cooperative financial institutions and long-term credit banks.'
Securities firms and commercial banks were able to set up trust
bank subsidiaries starting in October 1995."6 The impact has
been to give everyone a foothold in each other's business. In
some areas, financial institutions have already done a great deal
with this small foothold. Bank securities companies, for example,
have already won the lead management position in underwriting
corporate straight bond issues and have boosted their share in the
underwriting business from 6% in 1994 to 37.2% in 1996.117
Although the acquisition and ownership of shares in a
subsidiary engaged in merger and acquisition activity is permitted,
the web of restrictions imposed on the activities of a subsidiary
precludes acquisitions in practicality; the Ministry of Finance has,
however, granted exceptions to this in rescue acquisition contexts
such as those for Cosmo Securities and Nippon Trust Bank. 8
Barring mergers or acquisitions of firms facing imminent
bankruptcy, merger and acquisition activity is reserved for entry
into new fields through the vehicle of a totally new subsidiary
with a limited scope of business. One commentator has noted
that, "instead of lowering walls between different segments, the
Ministry of Finance has created whole new categories, albeit
temporary, of mutant trust banks and emasculated securities
companies, each subject to their own new rules." 
11 9
15 Zenshinren and Nippon Credit Bank were granted permission in April
1994, with Tokai Bank and Norinchukin Bank gaining approval in September
1995 and IBJ in November 1995. In addition, permission was grantedfor the
acquisition of Nippon Trust Bank in November 1994.
116 Nomura, Daiwa, Nikko, Yamaichi, and Tokyo Mitsubishi established
trust bank subsidiaries in October of 1995. Daichi Kangyo Bank (1995), Sanwa
Bank (1995), Sakura Bank (1995), and Asahi Bank (March 1996) have also
established trust bank subsidiaries.
117 See Courtis, supra note 7, at 17.
ns The Ministry of Finance has suggested that it would allow participation
in the full range of securities activities for an acquired subsidiary, as opposed to
newly established subsidiary, in order to enlist the aid of banks in baiing out
Japan's many troubled smaller securities firms. See Bankers' Embrace,
ECONOMIsT, Nov. 28, 1992, at 88.
119 Jones, supra note 49, at 439.
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3.3. Other Financial Subsidiaries
It is also noteworthy that the Financial System Reform Law
did not reform the Insurance Business Law and did not explicitly
state that banks could set up or purchase existing non-trust banks
as subsidiaries; in 1996, a new Insurance Industry Law finally
came into effect which permits life-insurers and non-life-insurers
to enter each others' businesses through subsidiaries.120 The law
merely began decompartmentalization within the insurance field,
but did not provide for any integration with banking or
securities. In June 1997, however, the three financial reform
councils (banking, securities, and insurance) recommended
further promoting mutual entry among banking, securities, and
insurance." Toward this end, the Ministry of Finance scheduled
to eliminate business restrictions on bank securities trust
subsidiaries as well as security company trust subsidiaries in
October 1999 and also allowed banks and securities companies to
establish insurance subsidiaries by 2001.1
As for bank control of other depository institutions, the law
only explicitly authorizes banks to control trust banks or failed
banks as subsidiaries."l Accordingly, the Ministry of Finance
stated its intention to submit a bill to revise the Bank Law and
implement it as early as fall 1998; the proposed revision would
explicitly allow all types of banks, including long-term credit
banks and trust banks, to control other banks as subsidiaries.124
In light of the removal of the holding company ban, discussed
infra Section 5, such regulation makes sense since one can create a
number of banks under a single financial holding company. Such
a revision would allow, for example, an urban bank to buy a
regional bank to deal only in small loans, allowing the parent to
concentrate on more risky businesses, like large-scale transactions,
international banking, and money-market trading; in addition,
the parent bank could also hold more than one regional bank as a
120 Hokengyo Ho [Insurance Business Law], Law No. 105 of 1996.
121 See Ministry of Finance, Financial System Reform (last modified June 13,
1997) <http://wvw.mof.go.jp/english/big-bang/ebb32.htm>.
12 See apps., tbl. 1.
1 The law in its current form, however, does not explicitly forbid bank
ownership of another bank.
124 See Finance Ministry Plans to Let Banks Establish Subsidiaries, NKKEI
WKLY., Jan. 19, 1998, at 13.
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subsidiary, allowing it to possess a network of regional banks
covering a specific geographic area. 2 '
3.4. 1997 and 1998 Reforms. The New Legal Environment
Under the Financial Laws
While the gradual phasing in of mutual entry subsidiaries
started the decompartmentalization of Japanese finance, the Big
Bang's re-engineering of the legal environment for corporate
combinations of financial institutions in 1997 and 1998 provides
much greater liberalization of corporate combinations among
financial institutions. The Japanese government enacted a revised
Antimonopoly Law on June 2, 1997 and on December 17, 1997
removed the ban on non-financial holding companies; however,
the government left the date of the lift for financial holding
companies open to be established by another law because it
desired to enact a finance-related businesses law to protect
investors first.
126
Finally, on December 12, 1997, the 141st session of the
Japanese Diet promulgated two laws eliminating the restrictions
on financial holding companies based on the conclusions of the
financial reform councils and they were as follows: (i) the
Finance Related Law Concerning Maintenance of Finance Related
Laws Accompanying the Removal of the Ban on the
Establishment of Holding Companies" and (ii) the Law
Concerning the Special Case for Merger Procedures for Banks. 2'
The Law for the Maintenance of Bank Holding Companies
amended the Bank Law and the revised Article 52(2) of the Bank
Law defines a bank holding company as a holding company
which has been pre-authorized by the Ministry of Finance to take
125 See id.
126 With respect to the revision of the antimonopoly law, the ruling
party's Antimonopoly Consultative Committee debated the issue that
culminated in the "Three Party Agreement Concerning the Amendment of the
Antimonopoly Law" (Dokusen Kaisei ni Kansuru San-To Goi). See
Kawashima Makoto, Ginko Mochikabu Gaisha ni Kanren Ho ni Tsuite, 1129
JURISTO 64, 64 (1998).
" Mochikabu Gaisha no Setsuritsu to no Kinshi no Kaijo to ni tomonau
Kin'yu Kankei Horitsu no Seibi to ni Kansuru Horitsu, Law No. 120 of 1997
[hereinafter Financial Holding Company Law].
12 Ginko Mochikabu Gaisha no Sosetsu no tame no Ginko to ni kakaru
Gappei Tetsuzuki no Tokurei to ni Kansuru Horitsu, Law No. 121 of 1997.
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a bank as a subsidiary.129 Bank holding companies are charged
with supervising subsidiary bank management and related
business to maintain their soundness; this involves restricting the
scope of bank activities, avoiding excessively risky activities,
ensuring efficient performance of banks business, and the
prevention of unscrupulous trading.130
Just as regulations limit the relationships between banks and
securities or trust bank subsidiaries, similar regulations, such as
arm's length transactions, restrict holding companies."' For
example, a managing director of a bank holding company cannot
become a managing director of another company concurrently
without specific authorization obtained from the Ministry of
Finance."'
The law places certain restrictions on the scope of a bank
holding company's business. Specifically, a holding company
may hold as subsidiaries banks (including trust banks), long-term
credit banks, foreign exchange banks, securities companies, and
foreign subsidiaries engaging in banking or securities. 33  In
addition, with designation by Ministry of Finance ordinance,
institutions "subordinate to, supplementary to, or related to
banking or securities" may also become subsidiaries of a holding
company.13 4  These include companies relating to bank
accounting, companies that supervise real estate for bank use,
credit card companies, leasing companies, investment advisory
companies, and companies that cultivate new business fields with
the approval of a ministerial ordinance (i.e., venture capital
companies).135
The law limits the bank holding company group's collective
acquisition of shares of companies in unapproved fields (i.e., those
fields that are not subordinate to, supplemental to, or related to
banking or securities). The bank holding company cannot
acquire or hold in excess of 15% of the total number of
outstanding shares, or the equivalent, of such a non-approved
129 Bank Law arts. 52(3), 52(4), amended by Financial Holding Company
Law.
130 See id. art. 52(6).
131 See id. art. 13-2.
132 See id. art. 52(5).
133 See id. art. 52(7).
134 See id.
135 See Makoto, supra note 126, at 66.
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company (a so-called "general enterprise company").1 36  To
prevent the 15% rule from becoming a barrier to the
establishment of bank holding companies, a bank holding
company exceeding this limit will still be approved, conditioned
upon disposal of the amount of shares exceeding the limit within
a five year period from the day the bank holding company is
formed. 3' In no case, however, may the shares in a general
enterprise company exceed 50% of the outstanding shares of the
general enterprise company.138
Beyond the Ministry of Finance's ability to implement arm's
length rules and designate fields "subordinate to, supplemental to,
or related to banking and securities," it can regulate capital
adequacy ratios for the holding group. 139 The Ministry of Finance
requires disclosure of regular annual and mid-year business
reports on the assets and business of the bank holding company
group and among others,"4 and also has the power to require
additional reports and materials and to conduct inspections.' If
the bank holding company violates an ordinance or commits an
act harmful to the public welfare, the Minister of Finance has the
power to dispose of the bank holding company. 42 This means
that if the bank holding company substantially violates its articles
bf association, violates an ordinance (horei), or commits an act
harmful to the public welfare, the Minister of Finance can order
the suspension of all or part of the activities of a subsidiary of the
bank holding company.4
The Deposit Insurance Law was revised to allow bank holding
companies to apply to the deposit insurance fund (yokin hoken
kiko).'" No special provisions of the Bank Holding Company
Law apply to securities companies since the necessary regulation
of proper trading acts related to securities trading intermediaries
is thought to be accomplished within the existing regulatory
136 Bank Law art. 52(8), amended by Financial Holding Company Law.
137 See id. art. 52(8).
138 See id.
139 See id, art. 52(9).
140 See id. arts. 52(2), 52(12), 52(13).
141 See i. art. 52(15).
142 See id. art. 52(18).
143 See id. art. 52(12).
144 Yokin Hoken Ho [Deposit Insurance law], Law No. 136 of 1957, arts.
2, 55-61.
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framework for securities companies. 45
Insurance companies, however, are treated somewhat
differently. In order to protect insurance policy holders, holding
companies making subsidiaries of insurance companies require
special approval46 and face restrictions on their scope of
business. 7 Like bank holding companies, insurance companies
must make holding company and subsidiary reports, submit to
on-site investigations, and subject themselves to other measures
similar to bank holding companies.'48  Additionally, a special
prohibition on subsidiary insurance companies explicitly
prohibits these companies from executing contracts deemed
excessively advantageous.' The collective 15% restriction,
however, does not apply to the shareholding of subsidiaries by
insurance holding companies.
The Special Law for the Establishment of Bank Holding
Companies amends the Japanese Commercial Code to provide for
a triangular merger (sankaku gappei) of bank holding companies;
however, this system poses difficulties because it requires
approvals for the transfer of assets and obligations among a
numerous and diverse group of claimholders."50 In a bank holding
company triangular merger, an existing bank, or other financial
entity, establishes a holding company-to-be. The contemplated
holding company then establishes a new bank. The original bank
and the new bank then merge, and the new bank subsidiary
becomes the surviving entity. As a condition of the merger, the
original bank shareholders approve the merger and get shares in
the new bank subsidiary. The stockholders of the old subsidiary
then give the shares to the new bank holding company in return
for newly issued shares in the bank holding company.
While the basic legal infrastructure for creating holding
companies has been established, unsettled tax issues" and the
145 SEL arts. 55, 65(2), amended by Financial System Reform Law. See
Makoto, supra note 126, at 69.
146 See Insurance Business Law art. 271-3,as amended.
147 See id. art. 271-5.
148 See id. art. 271(1)-(2).
149 See id. art. 301.
151 See Makoto, supra note 126, at 69. For a more detailed treatment, see
Hori Yutaka, Ginko Mochikabu Gaisha no Sosetsu no tame no Gappei Tetsuzuki
Tokurei Ho ni yoru Gappei Hoshiki Kento, 1477 SHoji HOMU, Dec. 15, 1997, at
27-32.
15' Tax problems with holding companies will be discussed briefly. See
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nature and timeline of regulations implementing the laws will
determine the future viability of holding companies in Japan.
The Big Bang promises to further modify these boundaries by
extending the permissible range of activities of specific financial
institutions and their affiliates and by freeing financial institutions
to enter into other business areas through holding companies.
4. ANTITRUST LAW
The financial laws and their implementation by the Ministry
of Finance have typically served as a first and generally fatal
barrier to most corporate combination aspirations by financial
institutions. Even those aspirants that successfully navigate the
regulatory maze to secure Ministry of Finance blessing must still
overcome the final legal hurdle of Japanese antitrust law.
4.1. Overview ofjapanese Antimonopoly Law
The basic form of Japanese antitrust law grew out of the
postwar efforts of the Allied Occupation to prevent the re-
emergence of the prewar zaibatsu. The zaibatsu were powerful
family-based groups that wielded massive control of the prewar
economy through conglomerations of financial institutions and
businesses linked through a web of holding companies and
interlocking directorates. Preventing the re-emergence of the
zaibatsu was a cornerstone of allied efforts to democratize Japan,
because the zaibatsu were regarded as collaborators with the
Japanese militarists and as engines behind the Japanese war
machine."5 2 As a result, a strict antitrust law, the Antimonopoly
Law of 1947,"53 was enacted. In its amended form, the
discussion infra Section 5.
152 Following the war, allied forces appointed the Supreme Commander of
Allied Powers ("SCAP"), which undertook a number of measures aimed at
breaking the power of the prewar financiers. These included suspension of
activities of allinstitutions unless permission was explicitly granted by SCAP,
the purging from office of senior executives, prohibitions on the sale and
transfer of securities of fifteen zaibatsu firms, the liquidation of zaibatsu
holding companies and many holding company subsidiaries, and prohibitions
on the use of zaibatsu names. See NORIO TAMAKI, JAPANESE BANKING: A
HISTORY, 1859-1959, at 186-92 (1995).
13 Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi oyobi Kosei Torihiki no Kakuho ni
Kansuru Horitsu [Law Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and
Maintenance of Fair Trade], Law No. 54 of 1947, as amended [hereinafter
Antimonopoly Law]. An English translation is available at the homepage of
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Antimonopoly Law still constitutes the core of Japanese antitrust
law. The original law even went so far as to ban, inter alia,
mergers, unless special permission was obtained. In 1949 and
1953 major amendments to the merger control provisions
substantially relaxed the restrictions on mergers." 4 Only recently
in 1997 and 1998, however, have amendments relaxed a total ban
on holding companies and severe limitations on shareholding by
financial institutions.155
The ban on holding companies and the limitations on
shareholding by financial institutions have particularly
compounded the difficulties of structuring successful mergers
among financial institutions. Different types of financial
business, at the very least, had to be segregated into different legal
entities, given the strict separation mandated by the financial laws
and their regulatory implementation. As discussed in Section 3,
for example, a bank could not merge directly into a securities
company because of the Article 65 restriction of the SEL. is6 At
the very least, either a holding company or subsidiary would be
needed to maintain the necessary legal separation. Holding
companies would have made mergers more convenient by
allowing the holding company to create a new subsidiary to
merge with or to acquire a new entity in a different field of
business. All financial holding companies, however, were
expressly forbidden by Article 9 of the Antimonopoly Law until
1998, when the 1997 revision went into effect.
15 7
An alternative solution for meeting separation requirements
mandated by the Antimonopoly Law is through the use of a
separate legal entity. However, the Antimonopoly Law also
forbids this by limiting the stockholding of financial institutions:
Stock ownership by a financial institution has been limited to 5%
the Fair Trade Commission of Japan <http://www.jftc.admix.go.jp/e-page
/f_home.htm> [hereinafter JFTC].
"' See Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi oyobi Kosei Torihiki no Kakuho ni
Kansuru Horitsu no Ichibu Kaisei [Law for Partial Amendment to the Law
Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and the Maintenance of
Fair Trade], Law No. 214 of 1949; Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi oyobi Kosei
Torihiki no Kakuho ni Kansuru Horitsu no Ichibu Kaisei [Law for Partial
Amendment to the Law Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization
and the Maintenance of Fair Trade], Law No. 259 of 1953.
155 See infra notes 175-209 and accompanying text.
156 See SEL art. 65, amended by Financial System Reform Law.
157 See Antimonopoly Law art. 9.
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unless special permission is granted."5 8 In practice, with the
exception of a couple of rescue mergers of distressed financial
institutions such as the acquisition of Cosmo Securities by Daiwa
Bank and the acquisition of Nippon Trust by Mitsubishi Bank,
special permission has not been granted to facilitate mergers and
acquisitions of firms engaged in traditionally segregated fields of
financial business. 59 As a consequence, the only theoretically
possible means of structuring mergers that satisfies financial
segregation requirements and antitrust law is limited to similar
financial institutions merging into the same legal entity. In fact,
in the postwar period, the only mergers of financial institutions
of any consequence are a few instances of banks merging with
other banks, and more recently, of banks acquiring bankrupt
affiliates as subsidiaries.
Financial institutions that have structured successfully around
Antimonopoly Law difficulties still have faced traditional
antitrust-law analysis as to the competitive impact of the
proposed merger or acquisition. 60 In this regard, Japanese
antitrust law has not proved, at least on its surface, a difficult
hurdle for mergers and acquisitions in the past. Such a
conclusion, however, must be carefully qualified. First, precisely
because the financial company laws and their implementation by
the Ministry of Finance have served as such a powerful barrier to
almost any merger and acquisition activity by financial
institutions, there has been extremely little development in this
body of Japanese antitrust law. Second, the Antimonopoly Law
and the restriction on stockholding by financial institutions have
made the occurrence of any merger and acquisition activity
among financial institutions extremely difficult, thus obviating
the need for antitrust review. Third, the dearth of formal
decisions or actions in this area does not address merger and
acquisition activity that has been stopped informally or through
self-restraint in anticipation of the expected reaction of the
Japanese Fair Trade Commission ("JFTC") authorities. 6'
158 See id. art. 11.
159 See Akira Ikeya, BOJ to Help Rescue 2 Credit Associations, NIKKEI
WKLY., Dec. 12, 1994, at 1; Hijiri Inose, Cosmos Bailout a Tempting Precedent?,
NIKKEI WKLY., Aug. 23, 1993, at 17.
160 See infra Section 4.5.
161 Indeed, industry criticism of the JFTC suggests that self-restraint may
deter some merger and acquisition activity. See infia Sections 4.2, 4.3.
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Recent legal changes, however, make more stringent merger
review a greater likelihood in the future. First, the Big Bang
reform of the financial business laws expands the range of
permissible merger and acquisition activities for financial
institutions.162 This will be particularly significant once the
remaining restrictions on financial business activities of mutual-
entry subsidiaries are eliminated. Second, the Antimonopoly
Law has been revised to revoke the outright ban on financial
holding companies under certain conditions and to remove the
shareholding limitation for the purpose of forming financial
holding companies.163 The removal of these barriers should
permit more combination activity to make it through these
preliminary filters and will require that the JFTC undertake more
evaluations. Accordingly, the JFTC at some point may heighten
its profile as the final gatekeeper for competitive markets. The
following section discusses the amended Antimonopoly Law, new
JFTC guidelines to implement the law, and guidelines offered by
past JFTC decisions in order to elucidate the likely role of the
JFTC in determining the new apparent boundaries of corporate
combination among financial institutions in Japan.
4.2. Overview of the Merger Review Process
The JFTC, an extra-ministerial body of the Prime Minister's
Office, was established as the administrative body to implement
the Antimonopoly Law.'" It acts as a completely independent
organ that boasts both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial165 TeJ
powers. The JFTC's enforcement powers are subject only to
162 See Ministry of Finance, Financial System Reform: Toward the Early Ach-
ievement ofReform (ast modified June 13, 1997) <http://www.mof.go.jp /eng
lish/big-bang/ebb32.htm >.
163 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
4 The JFTC consists of a chairman and four commissioners. The prime
minister, with the consent of both Houses of the Diet, appoints the chairman
and commissioners for five-year terms. See Antimonopoly Law arts. 29-30.
Appointees must be aged thirty-five years or more and be experts in either law
or economics. See id. art. 29.
165 For example, it can establish the procedure for handling cases as a quasi-
legislative power, and can issue a decision after a hearing as a quasi- udicial
power. See Structure and Role of the Fair Trade Commission (visited Oct. 8,
1998) <http://www.jftc.admix.go.jp/e-page/ftc.htm>. See also INTER-
NATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, How THE JAPAN
FAIR TRADE COMMISSION ENSURES A ROBUST ECONOMY 6 (April 1998).
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judicial review by the Tokyo High Court. 66 The Mergers and
Acquisitions Division of the Economic Affairs Bureau, one of its
four divisions, regulates corporate combinations- shareholdings,
interlocking directorates, and mergers.16
Except for particular exceptions set to take effect January 1,
1999, the JTFC must be notified of all mergers or transfers of the
substantial part of a business.'68 Although the formal merger
review process begins with the filing of a merger notification, as
required of all proposed mergers and acquisitions by Articles
15(2) and 16 of the Antimonopoly Law, it is normal practice for
the parties to the proposed merger to informally consult in
advance with JFTC authorities if they are concerned about the
possible application of any aspect of the Antimonopoly Law.6
The JFTC then examines the case to see if it possibly involves a
violation of the Antimonopoly Law. If the JFTC indicates any
problems at this consultation stage, the parties to the intended
merger either abandon their merger plan or modify it in order to
avoid an infringement of the Antimonopoly Law. While such a
procedure protects the privacy of the parties contemplating
merger, it creates a lack of transparency as to the standards being
formulated by the JFTC to judge merger and acquisition activity.
The formal procedure mirrors the informal one. A merger
notification is filed with, and examined by the JFTC. There is a
thirty day waiting period after notification is given before the
proposed merger or acquisition may take place. 7 The JFTC may
shorten or extend the required waiting period, but any extension
must not exceed sixty days and requires the consent of the parties
166 See Antimonopoly Law arts. 85-87.
167 The Economic Affairs Bureau (composed of four divisions and one
department which includes three divisions), a Secretariat (composed of three
divisions), and an Investigation Bureau (composed of four divisions and one
department which includes two divisions) along with five Hearing Examiners
(who hold hearing procedures commissioned by the JFTC) form the General
Secretariat, which is in turn attached to the JFTC.
168 See Antimonopoly Law arts. 15-16. As of January 1, 1999, only
mergers which involve one party whose total asset value exceeds 10 billionyen
and another party whose total asset value exceeds one billion yen will need to
be reported. Mergers between affiliated companies (such as a parent and
subsidiary) where the shareholding of outstanding shares exceeds 50% will also
be excepted. Almost identical provisions will apply to transfers of assets. See
id.
169 See id.
170 See Antimonopoly Law art. 15(3).
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concerned.71 If the JFTC finds that a planned merger or
acquisition is likely to substantially restrict competition, the
JFTC is empowered to prohibit it. This is just a formality,
however, as any problems have almost always already been dealt
with informally. Since its enactment, there have been only about
twenty cases arising from violations of the provisions in Chapter
IV (which deals with combination-related activity) of the
Antimonopoly Law.172 Prior to 1991,173 the last formal case to be
decided was in 1973.4 The 1991 case has been the only formal
case since the JFTC published administrative procedure standards
for examining mergers and shareholdings by companies.
4.3. Revision of the Article 9 Ban on Holding Companies
The Law for Partial Amendment of the Law Concerning
Prohibitions of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair
Trade ("Antimonopoly Act") was promulgated on June 18, 1997
to pave the way for holding companies.17 ' Article 9, as amended,
removed the general ban on holding companies and only
prohibited holding companies which "constitute an excessive
171 See id. art. 15(3). As of January 1, 1999, however, revisions will go into
effect allowing the JFTC to unilaterally extend this period. KOSEI TOR-IKI
IINKAI [FAIR TRADE COMMISSION], KIGYO KETSUGO KISEI NO TETSUZUKI NI
KANSURU DOKUSEN KINSHI HO NO ICHIBU KAISEI NI TSUITE [Regarding
Procedures for Regulating Corporate Combinations under the Partial Revision
of the Antimonopoly Law],May 22, 1998, at 1-2.
17 See Toshiaki Takigawa & Mitsuo Matsushita, Japan, in 1
INTERNATIONAL MERGERS: THE ANTiTRUST PROCESS 955, 965 (". William
Rowley & Donald I. Baker eds., 2d ed. 1996).
13 The JFTC took action against Nomura Securities Co. (Nomura), under
Article 17 of the Antimonopoly Law, for breaching Article 11, which
prohibits any financial company from holding more than five percent of
another company's outstanding stock. Nomura held in excess of five percent
of the equity in the Nomura Real Estate Company, and then requested some
of its affiliates to purchase these shares. Nomura violated the act by entering
into agreements with these affiliates precluding the sale of the affiliates'
holdings in Nomura Real Estate without Nomura's consent. The JFTC ruled
that Nomura was in effect illegally holding more than five percent of Nomura
Real Estate Company stock because Nomura had control over that company's
sales. See id. at 960 (discussing the JFTC decision of Nov. 11, 1991).
174 See id. at 959 (discussing Hiroshima Electric Railway Co. (HER) and
Hiroshima Bus Co., 1973).
175 Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi oyobi Kosei Torihiki Iinkai no Kakuho ni
Kansuru Horitsu no Ichibu Kaisei suru Horitsu [Law Regarding Partial
Revision of the Law Concerning the Prohibition of Private Monopolies and
Free Trade], Law No. 96 of 1997 [hereinafter Revised Antimonopoly Law].
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concentration of economic power." 176 In response to pressures
from the business world for a more objective standard, the
definition of holding company was changed from a "company
whose main business is to hold the shares of another company in
order to control another company" 7 7 to "a company whose
holdings in a subsidiary exceed 50% [including indirectly] of the
assets of the company."' 7 JFTC Article 9 guidelines further
define "the holding company group" as consisting of a holding
company, its subsidiaries (companies in which greater than 50%
of the stock is directly or indirectly owned by the holding
company), and subsidiaries substantially controlled by the
holding company." 9 A subsidiary substantially controlled by a
holding company is in turn defined as a company in which the
holding company owns greater than 25% of its stock, including
indirect ownership, and in which the holding company is a major
stock holder of the subsidiary.18
The holding group company is considered when determining
whether a holding company constitutes an excessive
concentration of economic power. Article 9(5) articulates the
concern that:
[1]f the holding company's general scale of activities is
substantially large and extends into numerous fields such
that the holding company is able to extend substantial
influence over the supply of funds to other enterprises, or
if the holding company group occupies influential
positions in a number of related fields of enterprise, the
holding company will wield a large influence over the
176 Revised Antimonopoly Law (amending Article 9(1)-(2) of the
Antimonopoly Law).
1 Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi oyobi Kosei Torihiki no Kakuho ni
Kansuru Horitsu [Law Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolization and
Maintenance of Fair Trade], Law No. 54 of 1947, as amended [hereinafter
Antimonopoly Law], art. 9(3), before amended by Revised Antimonopoly Law.
178 Revised Antimonopoly Law (amending Article 9(3)-(4) of the
Antimonopoly Law). See Suwazono Sadaaki, Dokusen Kinsbi Ho Kaisei An no
Gaiyo, KIN'YU SHOJI HOMU 30, at 31.
179 Kosei Torihiki Iinkai, Jigyo Shihai ryoku ga Kado ni Shuchu suru koto
to naru Mochikabu Gaisha no Kangaekata [Thoughts on Enterprise Power that
Constitutes a Holding Company with Excess Market Concentration],
December 8, 1997, at 1(ii) [hereinafter Iinkai].
180 See id. at 1(i)b,).
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national economy and become a barrier to the promotion
of fair and free trade.181
Toward this end, Articles 9(6) and 9(7) require contemplated
holding company groups whose combined total assets exceed 300
million yen to notify the JFTC before the establishment of a
holding company and to submit business reports for all the
concerned companies in the group at the end of each business
year.
182
Article 9 guidelines illustrate the factors used to determine
whether a holding company has an excessive concentration of
economic power, thus barring its establishment as a holding
company.183 The guidelines define three types of companies that
constitute holding companies with excessive concentration of
economic power, and provide four specific exemptions to the
label."' The exemptions are considered first, as they obviate any
need to consider the three types if the conditions are fulfilled.
First, an operational division reorganization is exempted when
subsidiaries of a holding company are established solely through
the process of splitting off respective operational divisions of a
company. 181 Second, a venture capital company exemption allows
venture capital businesses to operate as holding companies. 86
Third, a de minimis exception provides exemption from the
excessive market concentration characterization when the total
assets of a holding company group does not exceed 300 billion
yen."' The new financial business exemption is most relevant to
financial institutions because it allows a financial company to
enter financial business fields different from its own field through
the establishment of a subsidiary.'88 This exemption provides a
means for the expansion of a financial group's activities, allowing
financial institutions to take advantage of the liberalization
created by the Big Bang financial reforms.
8 Revised Antimonopoly Law art. 9(5).
182 See id. arts. 9(6)-(7).
183 See id. art. 9.
184 See id.
185 See Iinkai, supra note 179, at 2(v)(a).
186 See id. at 2(v)(b).
187 See id. at 2(v)(d).
188 See id. at 2(v)(c).
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With respect to mergers and acquisitions, this new financial
business exception would not appear to exempt a financial
institution from possible application of the "excess market
concentration" doctrine where there is an overlap in the
functions of the merging entities, i.e., where the business is not
new. This might be the case for depository institutions or
possibly even for the newly formed securities subsidiaries of
Japanese banks. Accordingly, a holding company that involves
the combination of two related businesses or does not fall into
one of the other above exceptions may need to consider whether
it falls within the following three types of holding companies that
constitute an excessive concentration of economic power.
Type 1 is a mammoth diversified conglomerate prohibition.
It is defined as a holding company whose group has total assets
exceeding approximately fifteen trillion yen, and which owns at
least five companies in separate principal fields of business (those
among the three-digit classifications of the Japan Standard
Industrial Classification in which shipment volume exceeds 600
billion yen) whose total assets exceed 300 billion yen each.'89 The
Type 1 category is not likely to apply to financial holding
companies due to restrictions on shareholding by financial
holding companies of general enterprise companies, and because
Type 2 holding companies address financial holding companies
specifically.
Type 2 is designed to keep financial institutions from mixing
with regular businesses, a legacy of the prewar zaibatsu groups
that linked powerful financial institutions with major businesses
in order to dominate the economy. A Type 2 holding company
is defined as one that owns a financial company with total assets
exceeding 15 trillion yen, or that is composed of companies not
engaged in financial business or in a line of closely-related
business thereto whose total assets exceed 300 billion yen each."9
A business engaged in "financial business or closely related
thereto" includes the credit guarantee business, the venture capital
business, the leasing business, the investment advisory business,
etc. 91 Accordingly, this category is not meant to prohibit
powerful financial conglomerates, but rather to prevent powerful
"' See id. at 2(ii).
'9 See id. at 2(iii).
191 Id. at supp. tbl. 3.
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financial institutions from linking with regular business.
Type 3 is similar to a Type 1 in that it covers large
conglomerates, but it lowers the thresholds where the subsidiaries
enjoy substantial positions in fields of trade that are separate but
closely related. A Type 3 company is one that owns at least five
companies (or even three companies if the degree of influence
which the companies possess, and the industries themselves, are
vast in scale) in separate business fields (from the 3-digit
classifications of the Japan Standard Industrial Classification,
business fields in which shipment volume exceeds 600 billion
yen), each of which possess a substantial position in the respective
business field (commands a market share of not less than ten
percent, or is among the top three companies in its respective
field, the said fields of business being inter-related).92  Inter-
relatedness refers to a situation in which there are trade relations
among different fields of business, and goods or services from
different fields of business are complementary to or substitutes
for one another. Banking, securities, life insurance and non-life
insurance are regarded as inter-related complements or substitutes
under the guidelines. 93
If the merging entities cannot structure a holding company
within the Article 9 guidelines, they can shed companies or assets
that allow them to fit within these contours, forego the merger
altogether, try to structure a merger without the use of a holding
company (i.e., use subsidiaries), or challenge the JFTC guidelines.
4.4. Stockholding Limitations for Financial Institutions
In merging or acquiring another financial institution, a
financial institution will have to overcome the Article 11
limitations on stockholding by financial institutions.'94 As in the
United States, the Japanese are suspicious of the banks' power to
control business, a legacy of the prewar days of large zaibatsu.
The Japanese approach, however, differs somewhat from the
United States. Japanese financial institutions have been able to
hold up to 5% of the outstanding stock in any particular
company but bank holding companies have been prohibited from
192 See id. at 2(iv).
193 See id. at supp. tbl. 4.
194 See Antimonopoly Law art. 11.
[19:41006
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss4/2
19981 M&A OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN JAPAN
stockholding until 1998.19 Even with these limitations, the
power of banks in the Japanese economy has been particularly
strong due to the under-development of the capital market for
corporate fund-raising. Indeed, major banks have used their
control of access to capital and this small percentage of
shareholding to establish a web of cross-shareholding (mochiai)
and to create bank-centered keiretsu groups that, in some ways,
approximate weak versions of mammoth diversified
conglomerates.'96
Of course, a strict enforcement of the Article 11 shareholding
limitation for financial companies would severely limit the
business activities of financial institutions, preclude the
establishment of subsidiaries or holding companies for financial
companies, and prevent mergers or acquisitions of financial
institutions. Accordingly, even before amended, the
Antimonopoly Law provided limited exceptions for specific
purposes such as the acquisition or holding of stock as the result
of the enforcement of a lien, pledge, or mortgage, or of payment
in kind; the acquisition or holding of stock by a company
engaging in securities dealing in the course of its business; and the
acquisition of holding of stock in the form of trust property of a
pecuniary or securities trust under certain conditions. 97
Additionally, the Antimonopoly Law granted the JFTC the
discretion to approve exceptions to this limitation if
authorization was obtained in advance.'
The JFTC's prior views on authorization, as made public
with its June 1994 Article 11 Guidelines,' made it clear that
approval would be granted for expanding operations internally,
rather than by the merger or acquisition of existing companies.
The JFTC stated that it would grant authorization in three cases:
(1) for the establishment of a subsidiary that is engaged in business
subordinate to the essential business of the applicant company; (2)
for the establishment of a subsidiary in a business activity
195 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
196 See generally TAMAKI, supra note 152 (explaining the keiretsu andzaibat-
su groups); Gilson & Roe, supra note 95 (outlining the keiretsu structure).
197 See id. art. 11(1).
m See id. art. 11.
199 JAPANESE FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, Administrative Procedure
Standards for Authorization of Stockholding by Financial Companies, (issued
on June 20, 1994, before it was amended on December 8, 1997).
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different from the one performed by the financial company; and
(3) new entry to Japan's financial business by a foreign financial
company.2"' Furthermore, such authorization applied only to
cases where the company issuing stock is newly established, the
applicant company owns greater than 50% of the stock, and the
new entry is made by said company into a business activity
different from the one performed by the applicant company."'
By contrast, the new Article 11 Guidelines0 2 facilitate
corporate combination activity by expanding authorization
without any conditions when the company issuing stock is a
financial company (including foreign financial companies). Of
course, this does not apply to combinations like ones prohibited
by Article 9 (when the said applicant company groups own
several companies, each of which possesses a substantial position
in several fields of business such as banking, securities, non-life
insurance, and life insurance). Nor does it apply to combinations
prohibited by Article 10 (when the effect of such stockholding
may substantially be to restrain competition in any particular
field of trade).
For cases where the company issuing stock is not a financial
company, authorization will be granted in only three cases. 3
The first case is if the company in which stock is acquired is
engaged in business subordinate to the essential business of the
applicant company.2" Previously, the standard for showing
subordination to the essential business of the applicant company
was "at least 90 percent, in principle."0 5 Under the revised
guidelines, only a more liberal standard of "at least 50 percent in
principle" applies. 6  In the second exception, companies
engaging in a line of business closely related to financial business
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investment in a company that engages in the business activity
(credit guarantee business, venture capital business, leasing
business, etc.)." This does not apply to combinations like ones
prohibited by competition in any particular field of trade.
Finally, and most importantly, the guidelines authorize
stockholding for a holding company that owns only subsidiaries
that engage in financial business or in a line of closely-related
businesses. 8 Approval will not, however, be granted where such
combinations run afoul of Article 9, or if the effect of such
stockholding may be substantially to restrain competition in any
particular field of trade in accordance with Articles 10 and 16.209
4.5. Substantial Restraint of Competition under Articles 10 & 15
Most contemplated mergers of financial institutions will find
little difficulty making it through these relatively black and white
limitations as long as activities are restricted to finance-related
fields. A proposed combination will, however, face some hazier
tests under Japanese antitrust law. Article 10 prohibits companies
from holding stock where the effect of such holding of stock may
be "substantially to restrain competition in a particular field of
trade."210 Similarly, Article 15(1)(i) prohibits mergers (including
mergers of holding companies) whose effect is to substantially
restrain competition in the market.2 ' There is no apparent
distinction in the Article 10 standard "substantially to restrain
competition in a particular field of trade" and the identical
language under Article 15.212
The forms currently required for reporting mergers provide
some initial guidelines to the concerns of the JFTC in preventing
"substantial restraint of competition" and one of two forms is




210 Antimonopoly Law art. 10.
21 See id, art. 15(1)(i).
212 See id. arts. 10, 15.
213 The two forms conform to "Rules Concerning Approvals,
Applications, Reports and Notifications under the provisions of Article 9-2
through 16 of the Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and
Maintenance of Fair Trade," Rule No. 1 of the Fair Trade Commission of
1953, as amended. The criteria for determining the circumstances under which
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an outline of the merger, an outline of the continuing company
or company incorporated post-merger, the relationship between
reporting companies and affiliated companies, the market share of
the post-merger company, and the merger objectives or reasons.214
Form No. 10 requires most of the same information as the
simplified Form No. 9, but the postmerger company's market
position for goods or services must be classified with respect to
the five following parameters: (i) a market share over 25%; (ii)
the largest market share, and holding 15% or more of the total
market share; (iii) the largest market share, plus the difference
between the market share of the top-ranked company and the
second or third largest company must be more than a quarter of
the market share of the top-ranked company; (iv) within the top
three companies, and the total market share of the top three
companies is 50% or more; and (v) the number of competitors of
the post-merger company in whatever market the reporting
company competes in (and in the case where the merging
companies are in the same market, the post merger company's
market) is seven or less.21 Form Nos. 11 and 12 for reporting
acquisitions of assets to the JFTC are analogous to the merger
forms.
216
The 25% screening criterion for market share has been of
central importance in the JFTC's review of proposed mergers.217
Technically, the 25% figure is just a criterion for more stringent
review.218 Mergers exceeding this amount may be approved and
mergers less than this amount may be theoretically denied.
Business leaders have criticized what they consider a strict 25%
each form is used is laid out in Administrative Procedure Standards for
Examining Mergers, etc. by Companies, (issued July 15, 1980, revised Feb. 1,
1994 & August 18, 1994), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL MERGERS: THE
ANTITRUST PROCESS, supra note 172, ch. 15, app. 3 at 1006-14.
214 It seems likely that once the new reporting requirements' revisions
come into effect in January 1999, Form No. 9 will be eliminated because the
revisions exempt from the reporting requirement most types of mergers that
come under Form No. 9.
215 See Form No. 10, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL MERGERS: THE
ANTITRUST PROCESS, supra note 172, ch. 15, app. 2, at 992-1005.
216 See generally Form Nos. 11 & 12, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
MERGERS: THE ANTITRUST PROCESS, supra note 172.
217 See e.g., FTC's Tough Merger Reviews Irk Industry, NiKKEi WKLY., Nov.
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rule of the JFTC as an impediment forcing them to abandon
mergers.219 In many cases, companies were required to cut back
on production to meet the 25% rule." More recently, however,
the JFTC has approved mergers and acquisitions exceeding this
figure.2
1
After a public relations push from Keidanren, the JFTC in
April 1997 unconditionally approved the Mitsui Toatsu
Chemicals and Mitsui Petrochemical Industries merger, which
gave the combined companies a 56% share of the phenol market.
In that decision, the JFTC took into consideration competition
with foreign manufacturers. m Also, in April 1998, the JFTC
approved two mergers in the cement industry pushing the 25%
threshold .m The unification of the cement sectors of Mitsubishi
Materials Corp. and Ube Industries Ltd. was approved with a
24.3% share.24 The merger of Chichibu Onoda Cement Corp.
and Nihon Cement Co. which reached a 39.3% market share was
also approved.' Moreover, the top three companies will control
more than 80% of the Japanese cement market. = 6 In support of
its decision, the commission stated that a strong rival still holds
20% of the market, import competition is expected to increase,
and the market clout of construction companies was likely to
maintain pricing pressure. =  One commentator has classified
cases where the 25% figure has been exceeded into five categories:
(i) where powerful competition exists from either domestic or
international competitors, (ii) where the merging company
219 See id.
220 See id.
221 See e.g., FTC Approves Big Cement Mergers, NIKKEI WKLY., Apr. 27,
1998, at 2.
2 For decision rationale, see Kosei Torihiki Iinkai (JFTC), Mitsui Seikyu
Kagaku Kogyo oyobi Mitsui Toatsu Kagaku no Gappei ni tsuite [Regarding the
merger of Mitsui Petrochemical Industries and Mitsui Toatsu Chemicals],
(press release), Apr. 9, 1997.




' For formal rationale of the JFTC decisions, see Kosei Torihiki Iinkai,
Chichibu Onoda to Nihon Cemento no Gappei oyobi Ube Kogyo to Mitsubishi
Materiaru ni yoru cemento no Togo ni Tsuite [Regarding the merger between
Chichibu Onoda Corp. and Nihon Cement Co., and the combination of the
cement business of Ube Industries and Mitsubishi Materials Corp.], April 23,
1998.
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disposes of assets, (iii) where the mergers are within a group of
affiliated companies, (iv) where the mergers involve entities'
customers that wield enough power to maintain pricing power,
and (v) where the mergers involve bankrupt companies.- 8
Japanese financial institutions going beyond the 25% threshold
would likely be able to claim several of these mitigating factors.
4.6. Precedents: M&A of Financial Institutions
Merger and acquisition precedent in the financial sector
provides minimal guidance as to what extent the liberalized 25%
rule applies to mergers involving financial institutions. This is so
given the fact that there have been numerous famous cases of
financial mergers such as the 1971 merger of Daiichi and Kangyo
Bank, the 1974 merger of Kobe Bank and Taiyo Bank to create
Taiyo Kobe bank, the 1985 acquisition of Heiwa Sogo Bank by
Sumitomo Bank, the 1989 merger of Mitsui Bank and Taiyo Kobe
Bank to form Mitsui Taiyo Kobe Bank (later renamed Sakura
Bank), the 1991 merger of Kyowa Bank and Saitama Bank to
create Kyowa Saitama Bank (now called Asahi Bank), and the
1996 merger of Mitsubishi Bank & Bank of Tokyo."
4.6.1. Mitsubishi Bank and Bank of Tokyo Merger
The JFTC published its rationale for approving the most
recent of these mergers, the merger between the Mitsubishi Bank
Co., Ltd., an ordinary commercial bank, and the Bank of Tokyo
Co., Ltd., a foreign exchange bank, to form the Tokyo Mitsubishi
Bank, an ordinary commercial bank." In determining the
relevant "particular field of trade," the JFTC focused mainly on
the nationwide impact that the merger would have on interbank
relationships because both banks were city banks that conducted
banking business through a large number of branches in a wide
area through the reasonable use of capital." The JFTC
distinguished city banks from long-term credit banks and trust
228 KAWAKOSHI KENJI, DOKUSEN KINSHI Ho: KYOSO SHAKAI NO
FEANESU 93-95 (1995).
"' See Yumiko Suzuki, In Giant Merger, Banks Paint Rosy Picture, NIKKEI
WKLY., Feb. 19, 1996, at 13; see also Bank Mergers and Assets, NIKKEI WKLY.,
Apr. 3, 1995, at 3.
230 See FAIR TRADE COMMISSION OF JAPAN, Major Cases of Corporate
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banks on the basis that the former were thought to have a
different client base than the latter two, due to the following
facts: (i) both long-term credit banks and trust banks have limits
on deposits that they can accept and on the establishment of
branches; (ii) long-term credit banks and trust banks have means
of obtaining capital that city banks are not permitted to use, such
as the issuance of debentures and loan funds; and (iii) long-term
credit banks have restrictions on the establishment of
storefronts. 2
The JFTC then partially distinguished regional banks and
second-tier regional banks from city banks by ascertaining the
relevant particular fields of trade threatened by the merger.23 3
The JFTC noted that city banks, regional banks, and second-tier
regional banks are all ordinary commercial banks and that their
financing targets are becoming similar (as shown by the recent
increase in the percentage of loans to small- and medium-sized
industries from city banks)." But the JFTC noted that the
operations and clients of regional banks and second-tier regional
banks are mainly situated in the prefectures of their
headquarters.23 Furthermore, city banks tend to become the
main banks of large corporations listed on a major exchange,
whereas regional banks and second-tier regional banks mainly
conduct their business with local industry.23 Accordingly, the
JFTC analyzed the impact of the merger on deposit and loan
operations on a nation-wide level, but also studied the impact of
increased concentration in various regions.23
Having defined the relevant "particular fields of trade," the
JFTC found acceptable a postmerger market share, among
domestic city banks, of 14.2% in terms of deposits and 14.7% in
terms of lending, putting the Tokyo Mitsubishi Bank second
among banks with nationwide operations." It ranked first
among city banks in loans to large corporations with 19.1%,







23' See id. at 60.
239 See id.
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rationale that the proposed merger would not necessarily lead to
substantial restriction of competition in the relevant market, the
JFTC stressed that (i) the market share would not exceed 15% (in
terms of both deposit and lending), and the difference in market
share between the new bank and the bank ranking third would be
only 2%; (ii) no extraordinary increase in market share in specific
geographical areas was expected; (iii) the new bank's share of the
foreign exchange businesses in Japan would be less than 15% in
terms of both inter-bank transactions and transactions with
customers; (iv) the competition between banks would be expected
to increase due to the decrease in the ratio of loans from banks
procured by corporations and the deregulation and abolition of
competition-restricting regulations such as interest rate
regulations and operational regulations; and (v) although the share
of loans to large-scale business would be 19.1%, the difference in
market share with the second largest bank is merely 2.6% in an
environment marked by increasing competition and low credit
risk for stable large-scale businesses.' Furthermore, the JFTC
noted that corporations "in recent years have been utilizing their
credit to issue low-interest commercial papers and corporate
debentures, etc., to increase the procurement of funds to pay back
loans from banks, thereby increasing the competition between
these types of direct financing methods and bank loans."241
Moreover, in the field of foreign exchange transactions, the
extension of business hours of foreign exchange markets as well as
the development of communication technology was expected to
lead to increased interactions between the Tokyo market and
overseas markets, heightening global competition in the
business.242 Although any competition analysis is likely to be
case-by-case, it appears likely that at least a 15% share in the
relevant markets of financial institutions would be considered
relatively safe, and that global and domestic competition would
also play an important part in the analysis of other mergers
involving financial institutions.243
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4.6.2. Wakashio Bank
A wave of mergers among second-tier regional banks in the
1990s has also not met opposition from the JFTC; the fact that
these banks are all relatively small, however, and that those
merging are either bankrupt or near bankrupt institutions that
present little danger of restraining competition generally does
little to elucidate the boundaries of acceptable market share.'
One slight exception to this, however, is the March 1996 collapse
of Taiheiyo Bank and the involvement of larger banks in its
successor entity."' This case involved a plan by Sakura Bank to
establish the Wakashio Bank with a 100% investment to serve as a
receiver for transfer of the operations of the Taiheiyo Bank after
Taiheiyo Bank's failure.246 Previously, four city banks (Sakura
Bank, Fuji Bank, Tokai Bank, and Sanwa Bank) had supported
the rehabilitation of the Taiheiyo Bank, but the bursting of the
economic bubble raised the value of the bad debts held by the
Taiheiyo Bank to the point that it was no longer possible for the
bank to continue operations.24 At the request of the financial
authorities, the Taiheiyo Bank dissolved and reached an
agreement for Sakura Bank to establish a subsidiary in the form of
a new bank to serve as a receiver of the Taiheiyo Bank.248
As a prelude to the preceding agreement, the Sakura Bank
conducted a preliminary consultation with the JFTC regarding
the joint investment by the four banks for the establishment of a
244 These mergers include the following: the April 1992 takeover of Toho
Sowa Bank by Iyo Bank, a regional bank; the April 1993 merger of Ugo Bank
with Akita Akebono Bank, a regional bank, to form Hokuto Bank; the Augut
1995 collapse of Hyogo Bank and its succession by Midori Bank, finances by
local companies and banks in January 1996; the March 1996 collapse of
Taiheiyo Bank and its succession by Wakashio Bank, with the financing of
Sakura Bank in September 1996; the collapse of Hanwa Bank under suspension
order by the Ministry of Finance and the taking over of deposits by the newly
established Kii Deposit Management Bank; the October 1997 merger
announcement of Fukutoku Bank and Bank of Naniwa, effective October
1998; and the plan of Kyoto Kyoei Bank to transfer all operations to Kofuku
Bank as of October 1998. See Kazunari Yokota, Mergers Reduce Ranks of
Kansai Banks, NIKKEIWKLY., Oct. 20, 1997, at 13.
245 See FAIR TRADE COMMISSION OF JAPAN, Major Cases of Corporate
Combinations in Fiscal 1996, FTC/JAPAN VIEWS No. 30 available at < http://





Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J Int'" Econ. L.
receiver."4 The JFTC indicated that if each of the market shares
of deposit and lending operations of ordinary banks conducted by
the Taiheiyo Bank and the four banks in Tokyo, which is their
primary business market, are combined, these total over 30% and
under 30% respectively.2"' Under these circumstances, the
adoption of a joint investment scheme would give rise to a
collaborative relationship among the four banks, and the risk that
competition would be substantially restricted in a particular field
of trade. The four banks then agreed to have the Sakura Bank
invest 100% of the capital needed to establish a new bank.2"'
Because the new plan involved a bank holding over 5% of the
stock of another company, authorization was required under
Article 11(1) of the Antimonopoly Act."2 In this regard, the
JFTC applied the "Administrative Procedure Standards for
Authorization of Stockholding by Financial Companies" (June
20, 1994)253 These guidelines require consideration of the need
for the applicant company to hold the stock, the risk of an
increase in the economic power of the applicant company and the
extent thereof, and the influence on the market with which the
stock issuing company is affiliated. 4 The JFTC found that the
applicant company needed to hold the Wakashio stock in order
to avoid events such as a run on the bank by depositors and to
contribute to the stability and maintenance of the financial
system."5 That the combination of the two institutions would
push ownership in particular companies beyond 5% in some cases
compounded the problem.2 6 The JFTC dealt with this issue by
ensuring that by the time the stock issuing company would take
over operations from the Taiheiyo Bank, Sakura Bank would
dispose of its stock in any company that surpasses this 5%
ownership margin when it is combined with the stock of the
other company.




252 See Antimonopoly Law art. 11(1).
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shares of the Sakura Bank and the stock issuing company for
deposits operations was 11.6% (ranking fourth) and for lending
operations was 13.5% (ranking second)."s  Even with the
percentage increase in market shares of only 3.5% and 0.5%,
respectively, there were no changes in the rankings, and the JFTC
decided that the influence on the applicable markets was
minimal."5 9
From the Wakashio case, one can surmise that a 15% share in
banking operations in a particular market again appears to be safe,
while a 30% share raises the concern of JFTC regulators. Beyond
this range, it is more speculative as to whether a tighter standard
would apply to financial institutions than the general 25%
benchmark applied to other industries. On the one hand,
traditional suspicion against the overconcentration of financial
power lingers from zaibatsu days and financial institution
shareholding is still more tightly regulated than that of general
enterprise companies.2 ° On the other hand, the JFTC may prefer
to apply a relatively lenient standard to financial institutions
given their general weakness and the present restructuring in the
financial industry. Certainly, the JFTC has been more tolerant of
large market shares for declining industries in other areas seeking
to restructure."' Indeed, even before the recent liberalization of
antimonopoly law restrictions, the JFTC has been relatively
lenient toward mergers involving defunct institutions that tested
old limits of financial conglomeration; for example, Daiwa Bank
was allowed to take control of a nearly insolvent Cosmo
Securities in August 1993 and make it a subsidiary by bailing it
out in the form of a private placement of new shares.26  This bail-
out was treated as an exceptional case authorized for the purpose
of maintaining order in the financial markets.263  Cosmo
Securities survived the crisis as a listed company, rather than as a
wholly owned subsidiary of Daiwa Bank, and was allowed to
2" See id.
259 See iL
260 For example, even after recent amendments, Article 11 of the
Antimonopoly Law still prohibits shareholding in excess of 5% for financial
institutions (10% for insurance companies) unless an exception applies.
261 For example, see the cement and phenol mergers discussed supra
Section 4.5.
262 See Osaki, supra note 30, at 252.
263 See id.
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continue providing a full range of securities services as before.'"
A similar rescue of Nippon Trust Bank Ltd. was undertaken by
Mitsubishi Bank in November 1994.265
5. CONCLUSION
While it still is not clear to what extent financial institutions
will take advantage of the new legal regime for mergers and
acquisitions, merger and acquisition-related activity among
Japanese financial institutions has increased. No major mergers
have been consummated yet, but as financial restrictions have
eased in the past twelve months, an astonishing number of
mergers of small subsidiaries to create joint ventures and similar
strategic tie-ups has occurred.
5.1. Foreign Tie-ups with Japanese Financial Institutions
Most of the recent merger and acquisition activity has taken
place among Japanese financial institutions seeking tie-ups with
foreign financial institutions in areas where they lack expertise.
Foreigners, in turn, hope to boost their ability to access some of
the $1.2 trillion in household savings in Japan."' One of the
earliest and most talked about deals was the September 1997
agreement between Swiss Bank Corporation ("SBC"), which in
the Spring of 1998 merged with Union Bank of Switzerland and
the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan ("LTCB") to jointly
establish a securities company in the first half of 1998.67 The
LTCB-SBC alliance sought to start a full-scale private banking
business, an undeveloped business area in Japan. The two
companies plan to establish cross-ownership stakes and joint
ventures in Japan for investment banking, asset management, and
private banking.269 LTCB will operate as a holding company and
will close some of its offices. 7  More recently, in June of 1998,
264 See id.
265 See id.
266 See Asako Ishibashi, Small Investors Buying Bargain Equities: Some
Analysts Say Renewed Purchasing Marks Bottom, but Institutional Investors
Needed for Rebound, NIKKEI WKLY., Sept. 21, 1998, at 12.
26 See Kazunari Yokota, LTCB Pins Long-Term Hope on Swiss Bank Ally,
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Travelers Group agreed to take a 25% stake in Nikko Securities
(Japan's third largest securities firm)." Under the agreement,
Nikko will combine its overseas operations with Salomon Smith
Barney, a Travelers subsidiary. 2 Nikko and Travelers will also
form a joint venture in Japan to be 51% owned by Nikko, and
which will encompass all of Nikko's business for corporate
clients and all of Salomon Smith Barney's Tokyo operations, with
the exception of proprietary account trading."
Several recent mergers and acquisitions have involved foreign
financial institutions picking up the desirable pieces of weak or
shattered Japanese financial institutions. For example, in
November 1997, Merrill Lynch reached an agreement to establish
a Japanese subsidiary to take over 2000 employees and 31
branches of Yamaichi Securities Company, formerly Japan's
fourth largest investment bank.274 It plans to open a nationwide
brokerage firm to sell mutual funds, convertible bonds, and
foreign currency products to Japanese investors. 5
Another recent tie-up in which a strong U.S. financial
institution picked up choice pieces of a weak Japanese financial
institution more closely resembles a merger. GE Capital, the
13th largest insurer in the United States, announced a $1.2 billion
joint venture with Toho Mutual Life Insurance, Japan's 12th
largest insurer, to sell life and health coverage." 6 As part of the
deal, GE Capital boosted Toho Mutual's capital base through
purchase of subordinated bonds totaling tens of billions of yen. '
The joint venture was capitalized at thirty-six billion yen and
owned 90% by GE Capital and 10% by Toho Mutual Life, with
Toho Mutual Life providing the company's president and many
271 See Makoto Sato, Financial Realignment Picks Up Speed: Nikko-Travelers




274 See Bullish on Japan, Bus. WK., Mar. 2, 1998, at 40, 41.
27' See id. By late summer, Merrill Lynch & Co. will offer domestic global
investment trusts (mutual funds) plus convertible bonds and foreign currency
investments. See id. Merrill Lynch Japan Securities will later merge with
Merrill Lynch Japan Inc., which concentrates on institutional sales. See id.
276 See Tatsuya Inoue, U.S. Insurer Joins Alliance to Ease Entry, NIKKEI
WKLY., Feb. 23, 1998, at 15.
277 See id.
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managers. 8  GE Capital and the joint venture bear no
responsibility for existing policies, but the joint venture receives
the rights to sell future insurance policies through Toho's office
network. 9 Although Toho Mutual Life is restricted to existing
insurance policies, it will accept 30-50% of total reinsurance
policies from the joint venture for ten years.280 This structure
allows GE capital to have its cake and also eat it by receiving the
benefits of the Toho network along with limited downside
liability risks.
5.2. Domestic Activity
Much of the recent activity in acquisitions among domestic
institutions has focused on picking up the pieces from financial
institutions that have faltered. Chuo Trust & Banking
Company's takeover of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank's Honshu
operations, announced February 17, 1998, is one example.281 The
acquisition moved Chuo Trust from last in number of branches
to twice as large a trust-banking network as its next biggest
competitor.282
There are also signs that the market is rewarding more
aggressive behavior on the part of Japanese financial institutions.
Following Chuo Trust's acquisition of part of Hokkaido
Takushoku,283 Moody's Investor Service (a prominent U.S. credit
rating institution) indicated that a rating upgrade could follow.284
As a result, its stock price started climbing and deposits and
purchases of its trust products have soared in the ensuing months.
North Pacific Bank earlier inked a similar agreement to absorb
Hokkaido Takushoku's business in its home region of
Hokkaido.28 The rumor mill continues to churn with talk of
278 See id. The companies will put another Y36 billion as legal reserve, and
the joint venture will accept 172 billion in subordinated loans making the joint




281 See Chuo Trust Bucks Trend with Hokkaido Takushoku Deal, NKKEI
WKLY., Feb. 23, 1998, at 14 [hereinafter Chuo Trust].
282 See id.
283 See Takeshi Ozawa, Acquisition Plan Pays off Early for Chuo Trust,
NIKKEIWKLY., May 11, 1998, at 10.
284 See id.
285 See Chuo Trust, supra note 281, at 14.
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additional nascent deals.286
The desire for keiretsu groups to form holding companies is
also expected to boost some combination activity. Some keiretsu
affiliates have already begun merging small affiliates. For
example, the Dai-Ichi Kangyo. group combined Asahi Investment
Trust Management Company, Kankaku Capital Management
Company, and Daichi Kangyo Investment Management to form
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Asset Management.28 ' Although no financial
holding companies have been formed to date, plans are being
made at a number of financial institutions. Financial institutions
from the same keiretsu groups are a natural form for such
combinations given their histories of interlocking relationships,
shareholdings, management meetings, and that they often share
the same name. The Fuyo group companies, for example, have
announced a plan to eliminate overlapping operations. 28  Fuji
Bank, Yasuda Trust & Banking Company, Yasuda Mutual Life
Insurance Company, and Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance
Company will integrate brokerage operations, investment-
advisory subsidiaries, and other affiliates within two to three
years.29 As a first step, Yasuda Trust & Banking will transfer
operations from its securities unit to a subsidiary of Fuji Bank,
and its investment advisory affiliate will transfer operations to an
286 For example, life insurers from Germany and Switzerland are also
seeking tie-ups as a means of penetrating the Japanese market. See Tatsuya
Inoue, Insurer Opens Door for Foreign Ally, NIKKEI WKLY., Feb. 9, 1998, at 1,
13 [hereinafter Insurer Opens Door]. American International Group Inc. also
planned to examine the operation of Aoba Life Insurance Ltd. with a view
toward taking over the company. It would be the first purchase of a Japanese
life insurer by a foreign firm. Aoba was established last October to take over
the operations of failed Nissan Mutual Life Insurance Co. and is wholly owned
by the Life Insurance Association of Japan. See US. Company to Study Buyout
aIKIWL. Ar 0 8 at 17. NOrix, Japan's largestno finance firm, entered negotiations to purchase Yamaichi Trust
Bank Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of failed Yamaichi Securities Co. Orix
seeks to add a bank to its operations to provide its customers with a
comprehensive range of financial services, having already added life insurance
and brokerage operations to its primary leasing business. See Leasing Company
Begins Negotiating to Acquire Yamaichi Trust Bank, NIKKEI WKLY., Dec. 29,
1997 & Jan. 5, 1998, at 13.
287 See Yuri Yamamoto, Asset Managers Merge Before 'Big Bang'NIKKEI
WKLY., Mar. 17, 1997, at 12.
288 See Fuyo Group Companies to Cut out Overlapping Operations, NIXXEI
WKLY., Mar. 16, 1998, at 10.
289 See id.
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arm of Yasuda Mutual Life Insurance at the end of March 1998.290
The use of a group holding company is expected to streamline the
decision-making process, promote the development of new
financial products, and enhance client cultivation by allowing
closer ties to better serve common customers. Experts predict the
Mitsui group companies of Sakura Bank, Mitsui Trust & Banking
Company, Mitsui Marine & Fire Insurance Company, and Mitsui
Mutual Life Insurance Company will pursue a similar plan.29'
Sumitomo Bank has also hinted at the possibility of the formation
of alliances and a holding company.292
5.3. Further Obstacles
Some people in the Japanese financial community downplay
the need for any merger activity. The Senior Managing Director
of Daiwa Bank has said that it will not seek mergers but, rather, it
will seek strategic alliances, such as the one it has with Asahi
Bank, and will also seek strategic alliances with foreign financial
institutions in weak fields but without capital alliances.293 Seiji
Otsuka, banking industry analyst at Schroder Japan Ltd. has said,
"Japanese banks will not engage in mega-mergers.... In order
for a merger to be effective, merging institutions should have
their own specialties and strengths. But Japanese banks have not
yet downsized their organizations by putting their resources in a
specialized area. U.S. banks have already gone through that
process." 294  The key to winning the competition will be an
alliance with foreigners.29 Other commentators warn of financial
colonization (kin'yu shokuminka) and the "Wimbledon effect" to
Japan's markets-whereby Tokyo becomes a world class market,
but none of the winners are Japanese.296
Furthermore, legal difficulties continue to compound merger
and acquisition activity. For example, commentators have
290 See id.
291 See id.
292 See Kazunari Yokota, Sumitomo Bank Executive Plans for Global
Competition, NIKKEI WKLY., Mar. 30, 1998, at 15.
293 See Kazunari Yokota, Daiwa Bank Poised to Bolster Trust Business,
NIKKEI WKLY., Mar. 2, 1998, at 10.
294 Japan to Feel Effects, supra note 14, at 12.
295 See id.
296 Sumitomo-Daiwa Pact Offers Hope for Domestic Financial Companies,
NuBI WKLY., Aug. 3, 1998, at 14.
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blamed lax accounting standards for masking huge debts, thereby
increasing the risk of a potential acquisition. The huge hidden
debts of Yamaichi, for instance, hint that unpleasant surprises
may await any acquirer of a Japanese financial institution .2 ' Deal
structures that avoid outright mergers, such as that of the GE
Capital-Toho deal and the Traveler's Nikko deal, can minimize
some of the downside risk.298 A larger issue for reorganization is
tax-driven. For existing companies to create holding companies,
they must pay an asset-transfer tax, registration, and license
taxes.299 Banks, however, will be giving preferential tax treatment
for fiscal 1998 to bank shareholders by possibly halving transfer
taxes and securities transaction taxes levied when they exchange
their bank shares with shares of the newly established bank
holding companies."° Such tax incentives are not available for
holding companies' brokerages, securities firms, or nonfinancial
businesses."' Moreover, that a holding company group is not yet
permitted to file consolidated tax returns minimizes one of the
advantages of forming a holding company. 2 Further, the speed
of decompartmentalization puts a ceiling on the pace of
integration activity. For example, although the Fuyo group is
considering establishing a holding company, Yasuda Life, as a
mutual company, it cannot come under the control of the
envisioned holding company.3 Fuyo is therefore considering
another plan under which the four financial companies of the
group would first establish a joint holding company to control
integrated subsidiaries while awaiting further deregulation."°
With much of the legal environment newly liberalized,
however, the economic forces will prove too powerful for many
institutions to ignore the merger and acquisition option. In
297 See Yuri Yamamoto, Yamaichi Securities Closing Marks End of Era,
NIKKEI WKLY., Mar. 30, 1998, at 15.
29 See Insurer Opens Door, supra note 286, at 1.
299 Interestingly, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp. will be
exempted from these taxes when it splits up its operations into a holding
company in 1999. See Tax Changes Would Clear Wayfor Wider Use of Holding




"' See Holding Companies at Core of Push Toward Conglomerates, NKKEI
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particular, cash-rich foreign firms with cutting-edge risk and asset
management technology, but limited success in penetrating
Japan's financial markets, make natural partners for debt-laden
Japanese firms dulled by lack of competition but enjoying insider
access to a massive pool of savings. Kenneth Courtis, chief
economist at Deutsche Bank, has argued that many institutions
will have to disappear by merger or takeover."' He notes that in
1980, a few years before the beginning of the Big Bang in the
United Kingdom, few would have believed that by 1997 there
would be but four major British financial institutions left:
Lloyds, Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, Barclays, and
NatWest." 6 Many other British financial institutions disappeared
as they merged with Swiss, German, Dutch, and American firms.
Deregulation in the United States has had a similarly profound
impact on the financial landscape.
As major companies continue to merge to increase their
global competitiveness in an increasingly international business
environment, Japanese financial institutions can ill-afford to
ignore the use of mergers and acquisitions in an environment
where capital is a commodity that flows quickly and easily across
borders. The recent deregulation of the financial world and the
economic realities faced by Japan mean that a brave new world
for mergers and acquisitions among financial institutions must
arise in order for Japanese financial institutions to meet the
challenges of the 21st Century.
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Big Bang Timeline and Projections3 °7
1025
Timeline Financial Deregulation
April 1996 Life and Casualty Insurers can compete in
each other's business through subsidiaries
June 1997 Stock options legalized
July 1997 Listed single stock options introduced
October 1997 Securities trust affiliates offer loan trusts
Banks securities affiliates can deal in
convertible bond secondary market
December 1997 Banks can rent space to their investment
trust affiliates which are allowed to sell
their products at banks
Securities companies can offer securities
general accounts
1997 Regional banks to offer trust products
January 1998 Non-financial holding companies
legalized
April 1998 New Foreign Exchange Law introduced
allowing companies and individuals to
make foreign-exchange transactions
without government authorization
April 1998 Freeing of stock transaction fees on large-
lot transactions above 50 million yen
April 1998 Financial holding companies introduced
1998 Non-life insurance fees liberalized
Fiscal 1998 Securities companies go from licensing to
registration
Banks allowed to sell investment trusts
directly
Corporate investment trusts legalized
Securities companies allowed to expand
asset-management services
See Ministry of Finance, Financial System Reform: Toward the Early
Achievement of Reform (last modified June 13, 1997) <http://www.mof.go.jp
/english/big-bang/ebb32.htm>; December Special Supplement, NKKEI MANE,
Dec. 10, 1997, at 1-135.
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October 1999 Securities companies trust affiliates
allowed into pension trust market
During 1999 Bank securities subsidiaries allowed into
the primary and secondary market for
securities
Total liberalization of stock transaction
fees
Fiscal 1999 Banks allowed to issue straight bonds
Second half of Barriers keeping banks, trust banks, and
fiscal 1999 securities companies from entering one
another's markets removed
January 2000 Domestic non-life insurers allowed to
enter securities, banking, and trust
bankingI
End of 2001 Banks and securities companies allowed
to enter the insurance sector
Note: The above information was gleaned from various
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Table 2. Changes in the Number of Financial Institutions 8
Year AB CB RB TB LCB LIC P&C SC
1945 70 NA NA NA 1 21 16 531
1950 70 13 50 6 1 20 20 936
1955 83 13 62 6 2 20 20 700
1960 87 13 64 7 3 20 20 552
1965 87 13 64 7 3 20 20 484
1970 86 15 61 7 3 20 21 271
1975 86 13 63 7 3 21 22 258
1980 86 13 63 7 3 21 22 251
1985 87 13 64 7 3 23 23 221
1990 87 13 64 17 3 26 25 220
1994 85 11 64 17 3 27 125 212
Legend:
AB = All Banks
CB = Commercial Banks
RB = Regional Banks
TB = Trust Banks
LCB = Long-term Credit Banks
LIC = Life Insurance Companies
P&C = Property & Casualty Insurance Companies
SC = Securities Companies
Note: This Table includes data on domestic institutions only
and excludes second-tier regional banks (former mutual banks).
Recently, a few second-tier regional banks have either gone
bankrupt or have began merger or acquisition procedures with
other second-tier regional banks.
308 See Endo, supra note 31, at 9, tbl. 1.2.
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